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Gambling is a form of entertainment with an ingenious billing
system.'
Were you wondering was the gamble worth the price.2
"Thanks a lot!" quips [the digitized voice of comedian Rodney] Dan-
gerfield, when a gambler deposits a buck in the [slot] machine.
"Your kids don't need college anyway!'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, along with most of the world, is in the midst of
an extraordinary expansion of legalized gambling, even though a vo-
ciferous minority argues that gambling should remain banned or
1. Anthony Curtis, Gambling-What Does It Cost?, in AMERICAN CASINO GUIDE 6 (Steve
Bourie ed., 2000).
2. JONI MITCHELL, That Song About the Midway, on CLOUDS (Warner Bros. Records
1969).




sharply limited. This Article is an attempt to add a new dimension to
the current debate on the legal status of gambling, to argue that the
question should not be simply whether to ban or allow gambling, but
also to ask what consumer protections and informational disclosures
should be provided to gamblers. States have acquired an immense
appetite for the revenues that legal gambling provides.4 Casinos have
developed sophisticated databases designed to help them lure regular
gamblers.5 No one, however, is protecting gamblers by mandating
that they receive even the most basic price information about slot ma-
chine use, the most popular product they are buying.
To maximize the utility that they derive from their activities, gam-
blers should generally be able to determine the average costs of gam-
bling. In that way, recreational gamblers could more accurately
determine whether their possible winnings and the pleasure they gain
from gambling justify the price. In addition, these gamblers could
effectively comparison shop between gambling opportunities, choos-
ing which casinos to patronize and which games to play.
On the other hand, recent research indicates that pathological
gamblers often engage in defective gambling strategies, misjudging
their inability to control random events and evaluate their losses.6
This research indicates that the provision of accurate information
about the true costs of gambling and the likelihood of losing may aid
pathological and problem gamblers in their efforts to gain control
over their gambling habits.7 This Article proposes a new regulatory
regime, "Truth in Gaming," designed to aid both recreational and
problem gamblers alike, and based on the clear, accurate, and timely
disclosure of the true costs of gambling.
Section II of this Article discusses the dramatic, recent expansion
of gambling in the United States and how states have come to rely on
gambling revenues. A huge part of this expansion has been the grow-
ing use of slot machines, as they have become the dominant form of
casino gambling. Section III describes the scope and social costs of
problem gambling, a growing challenge that accompanies the intro-
4. Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the Law, 64
Miss. L.J. 291, 311-12 (1995).
5. Chet Barfield, Being in Clubs Suits Them Fine: Gamblers Bet on Getting Gifts and Casinos
Can Count on the Returns, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 12, 2001, at B1.
6. Anthony D. Miyazaki et al., Promoting and Countering Consumer Misconceptions of Ran-
dom Events: The Case of Perceived Control and State-Sponsored Lotteries, 20 J. PUB. POL'v & MAR-
KETING 254, 254 (2001) (noting that gamblers may choose to participate in casino games
because they misperceive that "they have control over the random outcome of that game").
7. Francine Ferland et al., Prevention of Problem Gambling: Modifying Misconceptions and
Increasing Knowledge, 18J. GAMBLING STUD. 19, 20 (2002).
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duction of new gambling opportunities. Slot machines appear to be
among the most addictive forms of gambling, providing a fast, contin-
uous, and non-threatening form of wagering. Even though states reap
the financial windfall from excessive gambling, they do too little to
provide treatment or aid to problem gamblers.
In Section IV, I lay the basis for my proposal requiring disclosure
of the cost of gambling by discussing how to calculate the average cost
of a wager. The true average cost of any wager is not the amount of
the wager itself, but rather is the amount or percentage, on average,
of the wager that is retained by the casino and not returned to the
gambler. If expressed in terms of a percentage, the hold percentage
for slot machines or house edge for table games, is the percentage of
any bet that the gambler can expect on average to lose and the casino
to retain. If expressed as a fixed sum, which I term the hold amount,
it is the sum that, on average, the casino will retain and the gambler
will lose given a bet of a particular amount.
Section V describes how this basic price information is almost im-
possible to discover with any specificity for most slot machines
throughout the United States. While some states disclose price infor-
mation for classes of slot machines in their casinos, they provide such
data in a vague and outdated manner, making it less useful to the
average gambler. Worse yet, most Indian casinos do not disclose the
hold percentages or even the range of hold percentages of their
machines.
Section VI describes how gamblers would make use of accurate
price information. Recreational gamblers could use it for comparison
shopping, to choose between casinos, between machines in a casino,
or between different forms of gambling. Accurate price information is
essential to an efficient market, allowing consumers to compare prod-
ucts and determine how best to spend their limited funds. Without
this information, even non-problem gamblers may unwittingly take
risks they would deem excessive if they knew the extent of those risks.
Problem and pathological gamblers may also benefit from this form of
informational remedy, as current research indicates that excessive
gambling is accompanied by cognitive lapses-pathological gamblers
tend to misunderstand the randomness of slot machines, misperceive
the lack of control they have over machines, and systematically under-
estimate their losses.
I discuss the proper design of informational remedies in Section
VII, drawing on the analysis of other attempts to inform consumers.
Casinos could be required to display generalized warnings of the
hazards of gambling, but a far more effective system would be to re-
[VOL,. 63:217
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quire the disclosure of information tailored to a specific slot machine
or to a specific gambler. I propose two such disclosure requirements.
First, slot machines should disclose their hold percentages and hold
amounts through an interactive disclosure system that informs each
gambler how much, on average, would be lost given a particular bet.
As gamblers bet, a set of numbers on the slot machine would display
the hold amount and hold percentage for the machine given the
amount bet. Gamblers would, therefore, be able to discern how alter-
ing their gambling strategy changes the hold percentages and hold
amounts of the machine. Secondly, gamblers should be given access
to information about their own gambling winnings and losses con-
tained in the casinos' extensive databases. They could get this infor-
mation by gaining access to casinos' databases that track the wagers of
anyone participating in the casinos' affinity clubs. Even more effective
would be allowing gamblers to use a universal "smart card," a plastic
card with a computer chip that would allow gamblers to track their
wagers, winnings and losses, and hold percentages in all casinos that
they patronize. In Section VIII, I discuss possible objections to my
proposal, such as cost, complexity, and privacy issues.
II. THE RAPID EXPANSION OF LEGAL GAMBLING
IN THE UNITED STATES
Legal gambling has expanded dramatically in the United States
in the last twenty-five years.' In 1975, only one state, Nevada, allowed
casino gambling.9 The next year, it was joined by NewJersey. 1' Now
nearly thirty states allow casino-style gambling." In the last decade,
the United States gambling market was the fastest growing in the
world.' 2 The rate of participation in gambling at casinos has risen
steadily with its increased availability, rising from 9% of the U.S. popu-
lation in a 1975 study, 26% in a 1998 study, and 27% in a 2002 study.'"
8. As I. Nelson Rose has noted, it is difficult to conceive of another area of the law in
which so many states have completely reversed their position on whether a specific activity
should be illegal in such a short time. I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 7 (1986).
9. ROGER DUNSTAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA (Jan. 1997),
available at http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/crb97003.html.
10. Id.
11. David R. Francis, Costs vs. Benefits of Betting, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Jan. 21, 2003,
at 16.
12. Richard C. Morais, Casino Junkies: The Latest Gambling Wave Has Hooked Governments
Throughout the U.S., FORBES, Apr. 29, 2002, at 66 (citing a comment by Simon Holliday, a
partner at Britain's Global Betting & Gaming Consultants).
13. John W. Welte et al., Gambling Participation in the U.S. -Results from a National Survey,
18J. GAMBLING STUD. 313, 335 (2002). This study cautions against comparing the results of
the different studies, noting that they use differing methodologies. Id. at 315.
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In other words, more than 50 million Americans are currently engag-
ing in casino gambling each year. 4 The amount lost in casinos has
also been increasing at a dramatic pace, growing "from $9 billion in
1991 to more than $40 billion in 2001" with nearly $13 billion lost in
tribal casinos and more than $27 billion lost in casinos owned by cor-
porations. 15 While the casino market is maturing, and may not have
the frenetic growth of past years, it should still grow at a steady, albeit
somewhat slower, pace.' 6
The accessibility of legal gambling will likely increase in the near
future, with numerous states "considering expanding gambling li-
censes to staunch a flood of red ink."1 7 For example, the legislature in
Maryland, which has banned slot machines except for a few hundred
located on the Eastern Shore, in 2002 considered a proposal to allow
four state horse tracks to install 11,500 slot machines.' s Although the
proposal was rejected, the legislature voted to study slot machine gam-
ing and consider new legislation in 2004.19
The vast increase in legal gambling can be attributed in part to
the growing public acceptance of gambling as entertainment. Large
publicly traded corporations have taken over the ownership of gam-
bling establishments, removing the stigma of organized crime. 20 Le-
gal gambling has grown so quickly that it is affecting life outside of the
casinos. 2' After gambling was legalized in Mississippi, "[i]n some
parts of the State the cost of living is on the rise, there are housing
shortages, traffic problems have multiplied, drainage and sewage sys-
tems are strained, and social services are struggling to keep up with a
growing homeless population. 22
14. See HARRAH'S SURVEY 2003 PROFILE OF THE AMERICAN CASINO GAMBLER 13, available
at http://www.harrahs.com/about-us/survey/030948-Survey.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2004)
(noting that 51.2 million adults gambled in a casino in the last twelve months).
15. THOMAS A. GARRETr, CASINO GAMBLING IN AMERICA AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACTS 4
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.sds.frb.org/community/assets/pdf/CasinoGam-
bling.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
16. Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC, The Gross Annual Wager of the United States 2002,
available at http://www.cca-i.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
17. Francis, supra note 11, at 16.
18. JEFFREY C. HooKY & THOMAS A. FiREY, MARYLAND PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, LEGALIZ-
ING VIDEO SLOT GAMING IN MARYLAND: A BUSINESS ANALYSIS 3 (2003), available at http://
www.mdpolicy.org/research/econ/LegalizingVideoSlotGaming.pdf (last visited Jan. 2,
2004).
19. Id.
20. William R. Eadington, The Economics of Casino Gambling, 13J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 175
(1999).
21. See, e.g., Rychlak, supra note 4, at 292 (noting the positive and negative effects of




Many states are gorging themselves on their share of gamblers'
losses, viewing those losses as a popular source of income "because,
unlike taxes, participation is voluntary. '23  Connecticut received
$350.4 million from Indian casinos during 2001.24 Nevada reported
receiving $711.6 million in gaming fees and taxes during fiscal year
2002.25 NewJersey taxes casinos 8% on gamblers' losses, and received
$347.9 million in 2002.26 The importance of tax on gambling can be
seen by the fact that gambling "now generates far more public reve-
nues than either tobacco or alcohol," an estimated $27 billion nation-
wide in 2000, which is 45% more than was collected in 1997.27
As casinos have spread throughout the country, so have the num-
ber of slot machines. 28 There are currently an estimated 600,000 to
700,000 slot machines in operation nationwide. 29 It is difficult to dis-
cover the exact number of slot machines currently in operation. For
example, Native American casinos are not required to make the same
disclosures as state-regulated casinos.3° Additionally, payback reports
of slot machines and other electronic gaming devices are often
grouped together indiscriminately. 1 The number of slot machines is
growing rapidly, as one slot manufacturer sold almost 140,000 ma-
chines in 2002 alone, earning $846 million from those sales and an
"additional $882 million from leasing and profit-sharing agreements
for the highest-end models. 31 2
23. Id. at 311.
24. Fred Dickey, Who's Watching the Casinos? Indian Gaming is Transforming California
into the World's Gambling Mecca. Does Anyone in Sacramento Care?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003,
(Magazine), at 112.
25. NEVADA GAMING COMM'N AND STATE GAMING CONTROL BD., 2002 INFORMATION
SHEET, at http://www.gaming.state.nv.us/gamefact02.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004) (speci-
fying Nevada's actual received total to be $711,578,089).
26. See NEW JERSEY CASINO CONTROL COMM'N, CASINO REVENUE FUND 2002, at http://
www.state.nj.us/casinos/crf.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2003).
27. Morais, supra note 12 (citing an estimate by Christiansen Capital Advisors LLC).
28. Martha McNeil Hamilton, More Flash, Less Cash; High-Tech Slots Offer Extra Games,
Paper Payouts, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at EO1.
29. Id.; see also JOHN GROCHOWSKI, THE SLOT MACHINE ANSWER BOOK 19 (1999) (stating
that in 1999 there were probably more than half a million slot machines in operation in
the United States).
30. GROCHOWSKI, supra note 29, at 19.
31. John Grochowski, Slot Payback Reports are Inherently Flawed, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 9,
2001, at 24. It is difficult to distinguish precisely between slot machines and other elec-
tronic gambling devices such as video poker, video bingo, or video lottery terminals. One
potential solution would be to classify the electronic gaming device based on its features,
for example, the slot machine's traditional spinning reels, either actual or simulated, that
are activated by pulling a handle or pushing a button. VINCENT H. EADE & RAYMOND H.
EADE, INTRODUCTION TO THE CASINO ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 6 (1997).
32. Gorman, supra note 3. The manufacturer, IGT, "built 70% of the slot machines
played in the United States today .... " Id.
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Once a mere sideline to the main business of casinos-table
gameS13_Slot machines are now the star, as they are the top source of
revenues for casinos.34 The amount of money wagered and lost
through slot machines is staggering.3 5 New Jersey reported that gam-
blers lost over $3 billion in slot machines in New Jersey in 2002 com-
pared to slightly more than $1 billion in table games during the same
year. 36 Gamblers in Nevada dropped almost $6.5 billion in slot ma-
chines losses in 2003, or 67.3% of their total reported gaming losses in
the state. Slot machines are so popular that casinos dedicate about
80% of their floor space to slot machines, as well as other electronic
gambling devices (EGDs).38
III. THE SCOPE OF PROBLEM GAMBLING
As more states have legalized more forms of gambling, the
amount of problem and pathological gambling appears also to have
increased.39 The number of people who gamble excessively is, of
course, difficult to measure precisely, especially given disagreement
over what constitutes excessive gambling.4" Essential elements of
problem gambling are the difficulty in resisting gambling and the
damage caused by gambling on the lives of gamblers, including their
jobs, family, or personal lives.4 ' Pathological gambling is a step be-
yond problem gambling.4 2 Pathological gambling is classified by the
American Psychiatric Association as "an impulse control disorder" and
33. See, e.g., BILL FRIEDMAN, CASINO MANAGEMENT 299 (lst ed., 1982) (noting that as
recently as fiscal year 1970-1971, "slot machines still accounted for only 19 percent of the
[Las Vegas] Strip's gross casino Win.... as the Strip gaming-table income dwarfed the slot
income").
34. EADE & EADE, supra note 31, at 96.
35. See, e.g., ATLANTIC CITY CASINO INDUSTRY, DECEMBER 2002 CASINO REVENUES, at
http://www.state.nj.us/casinos/december02.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
36. Id.
37. NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BD. TAx AND LICENSE Div., NEVADA GAMING REVENUES
CALENDAR YEAR 2003 ANALYSIS, at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/Cyrr03.pdf (last
visited Mar. 6, 2004).
38. GARRETT, supra note 15, at 7.
39. See, e.g., DEAN GERSTEIN ET AL., NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR. AT THE UNIV. OF CHI.,
GAMBLING IMPACT AND BEHAVIOR STUDY (Apr. 1, 1999), at ix, available at http://
www.norc.uchicago.edu/new/pdf/gamble.pdf (reporting that there is a direct correlation
between the prevalence of problem or pathological gambling and the proximity of
casinos).
40. MICHAEL B. WALKER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GAMBLING 151 (1992).
41. Henry R. Lesieur, Pathological Gambling is a Psychiatric Disorder, in LEGALIZED GAM-
BLING 38 (Rod L. Evans & Mark Hance eds., 1998).
42. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, NGISC FINAL REPORT 4-1 (1999) (noting
that problem gamblers "fall below the threshold of at least five of the ten .. .criteria used
to define pathological gambling" by the American Psychiatric Association).
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it "describes 10 criteria to guide diagnoses, ranging from 'repeated
unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling' to commit-
ting 'illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or embezzlement' to fi-
nance gambling. '43 A recent meta-analysis of 120 studies of problem
gambling rates concluded that about 3.85% of Americans will be
problem gamblers during their lifetime, that 1.6% will be probable
pathological gamblers during their lifetime, and that 2.8% are cur-
rently (past-year) problem gamblers while 1.14% are current (past-
year) probable pathological gamblers. 4
Several studies have indicated the unsurprising result that making
gambling more accessible and available increases the number of path-
ological gamblers,45 though this conclusion has been disputed.46 In
one study, researchers found that, during a seven-year period, as more
gambling opportunities became available, the number of pathological
gamblers grew by 75%.47 Another study concluded that the "availabil-
ity of a casino within 50 miles (versus 50 to 250 miles) is associated
with about double the prevalence of problem and pathological gam-
blers. 48 Other evidence of the link between increased gambling op-
portunity and increased pathological gambling can be seen in "the
43. Id. (citing the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders).
44. HOWARD J. SHAFFER ET AL., HARVARD MED. SCH. Div. ON ADDICTIONS, ESTIMATING
THE PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A
META-ANALYSIS iii (Dec. 15, 1997), available at http://www.hms.harvard.edu/doa/html/
publications/meta.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
45. Louise Sharpe, A Reformulated Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Problem Gambling: A Bio-
psychosocial Perspective, 22 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 6 (2002); WALKER, supra note 40, at
151; Robert Ladouceur et al., Prevalence of Problem Gambling: A Replication Study 7 Years Later,
44 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 802 (1999). Rachel Volberg, who has conducted many prevalence
studies, states, "Results from a range of epidemiological studies support the existence of a
link between the availability of some types of legal gambling and higher rates of problem
and pathological gambling." Rachel A. Volberg, Fifteen Years of Problem Gambling Research:
What Do We Know? Where Do We Go?, EGAMBLING, Feb. 2004, at http://www.camh.net/
egambling/issuel0/ejgi_10_volberg.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
46. NATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR GAMING STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 35 (2000),
available at http://www.fsu.edu/-iog/psgcs.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2004) ("There is no
solid basis for concluding that the wider legalization of gambling, which has cut into illegal
gambling and friendly betting, has caused a concomitant increase in pathological
gambling.").
47. Ladouceur et al., supra note 45, at 802-04 (1999).
48. GERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at ix. Shaffer and Korn note, however, that it is
impossible to determine whether proximity to a casino causes the increased prevalence
rate or, alternatively, whether (a) problem gamblers are more likely to choose to live close
to a casino, or (b) casino operators choose sites near populations with higher rates of
problem gambling. HowardJ. Shaffer & David A. Korn, Gambling and Related Mental Disor-
ders: A Public Health Analysis, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 171, 177 (2002), available at http://
arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/ 10.11 46/annurev.publhealth.23.100901.140532
(last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
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tremendous increase in the numbers of gamblers seeking help when
casinos enter a market [and] the increase in gamblers anonymous
groups when gambling enters a state. . . ."" After reviewing the con-
flicting studies regarding whether problem gambling is on the rise,
researchers have concluded that "evidence suggests that adults from
the general population are evidencing a low but gradually increasing
rate of gambling disorders. If this trend continues unabated, it might
become appropriate to characterize disordered gambling in the gen-
eral adult population as pandemic."5 °
The fairly small percentage of problem gamblers accounts for a
far higher percentage of casino income, with estimates varying sub-
stantially.51 The gambling industry, however, argues that little of its
profits are due to gambling addiction and that it prefers not to deal
with pathological gamblers.
5 2
Not only are slot machines and other electronic gaming ma-
chines among the most popular, they are also among the most closely
linked to problem gambling. 53 First, they are the easiest form of gam-
bling; "non-threatening and user friendly to the uninitiated, thus[,]
they may offer an unparalleled 'gateway' activity to gambling. '54 They
are the most continuous form of gambling, as the slot player does not
have to wait for horses to run, a dealer to shuffle or deal, or a roulette
49. Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Business Profitability Versus Social Profitability:
Evaluating Industries with Externalities, the Case of Casinos, 22 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON.
143, 156 (2001).
50. Shaffer & Korn, supra note 48, at 186 (concluding that "[flor now, however, to
clarify this kind of characterization, prospective epidemiological studies are needed").
51. The National Opinion Research Center estimated that problem and pathological
gamblers account for about 15% of all gambling losses. GERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at
33-34 (stating that "[i]n casino play, problem and pathological gamblers account for 22.1
percent of past-year losses"). By comparison, a 1999 study concluded that, in Louisiana,
almost 30% of all riverboat casino spending comes from problem and pathological gam-
blers, as does over 42% of all Indian reservation casino spending in Louisiana. TIMOTHY P.
RYAN ET AL., GAMBLING IN LOUISIANA: A BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS 99 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Cory Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REv. 181,
200 (2002).
Compulsive or pathological gamblers account for a small percentage of all adults
who participate in legal gaming activities. Typically, casinos do not consider com-
pulsive gamblers to be good customers; although they will likely risk losing every-
thing in order to gamble, casinos actually prefer repeat customers that gamble
with discretionary income in exchange for receipt of entertainment value.
Id. Aronovitz, a nationally prominent gaming law attorney, fails to provide the basis for his
assertions regarding the percentage of gamblers who are compulsive or pathological. See
generally id.
53. Robert B. Breen & Mark Zimmerman, Rapid Onset of Pathological Gambling in Ma-
chine Gamblers, 18 J. GAMBLING STUD. 31, 33 (2002).
54. Id. at 32.
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wheel to stop spinning." A fast slot player can average almost one
thousand wagers an hour, approximately one wager every four
seconds. 6 Slot machines, moreover, allow players to regamble any
winnings they receive almost immediately, with little time to ponder
the financial repercussions. 7
Slot machine players account for a distressing percentage of
problem gamblers. 58 Studies estimate that up to 70% of treatment-
seeking pathological gamblers identify electronic gaming machines as
their primary, if not exclusive, problem form of gambling.59 Worse
yet, slot machine players are among the fastest to 'bottom out' and
reach the depths of full problem or pathological gambling.60 One
study indicated that the onset of pathological gambling occurred in a
third of the time, on average, for machine gamblers compared to
traditional gamblers. 6 1
In determining whether to legalize gambling, states have gener-
ally sought to balance the social costs of gambling, like crime, with
gambling's public benefit, such as increased employment.62 Some
states have tried to ascertain the complete social costs of gambling as
well as its social benefit, in order to compare the two.63 This analysis
is a difficult, if not impossible, undertaking, and each side of the de-
55. Id. (stating that "[mlachines are the most continuous medium of gambling. Bets
can be made and decided in a matter of seconds, with virtually no delay before the pattern
is repeated").
56. John Grochowski, The Faster the Game, The Faster You Stand to Lose Your Bankroll,
DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 23, 2003, available at http://info.detnews.com/casino/columns/de-
tails.cfm?column=grochowski&myrec= 161 (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
57. Mark Griffiths, Fruit Machine Gambling: The Importance of Structural Characteristics, 9J.
GAMBLING STUD. 101, 107 (1993).
58. Breen & Zimmerman, supra note 53, at 31, 33 (noting studies that showed that a
majority (upwards of 70%) of treatment-seeking [pathological gamblers] participated al-
most exclusively in machine gambling").
59. Id.
60. VALERIE C. LORENZ ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDIC-
TION IN MARYLAND 16 (Feb. 15, 1990), available at http://www.nyu.edu/its/socsci/Docs/
task force_4.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2004); see also Rychlak, supra note 4, at 292 (detailing
many of the problems that gambling facilitates).
61. Breen & Zimmerman, supra note 53, at 41 (finding that for the subjects in their
sample, the mean latency until the onset of pathological gambling was only 1.08 years for
machine gamblers, compared to 3.58 years for traditional gamblers).
62. See, e.g., RYAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 17-21 (noting the possible costs and benefits
derived from legalized gambling).
63. Id. The Report states, however, that
there are some costs and benefits that are impossible or difficult to quantify but
are important .... Since non-quantifiable costs and benefits cannot be included,
readers must understand that it is impossible to reach a simple conclusion that
"gambling is good for the State" or "gambling is bad for the State."
Id. at 17.
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bate tends to exaggerate either the costs or benefits of casinos, de-
pending on whether they support or condemn them.6 4
There is great conflict over how to define and ascertain both the
social costs and the public gains that can be attributed to gambling.
65
Estimates of these social costs vary wildly, depending on how they are
defined and which sets of data are used to derive the costs. 66 Some
have argued that gambling's effects include higher rates of crime, in-
cluding prostitution and white collar crime, detrimental effects on
families, 67 such as increased rates of divorce and child abuse, and in-
creases in drug and alcohol addiction.68 Others claim that gambling
hurts the economy of a state in which it is legal; they assert that legal-
ized gambling destabilizes the business environment, increasing per-
sonnel Costs, 6 9 and increases the number of personal bankruptcies,
forcing third parties to lose money because of the gamblers' inability
or unwillingness to pay their debts.7" Gambling is often part of,
though not necessarily the cause of, many ruined lives.7 For exam-
64. Douglas Clement, Milking the New Buffalo, FEDGAZETrE, Mar. 1, 2003, at 6.
65. See Douglas M. Walker, Methodological Issues in the Social Cost of Gambling Studies, 19 J.
GAMBLING STUD. 149, 153 (2003) (defining social costs "as a decrease in the aggregate real
wealth of society"). Eadington distinguishes between the "narrow" definition of social costs
as negative changes in total social wealth and the "broader" definition that also includes
non-market effects on gamblers and their families and acquaintances. William R. Ead-
ington, Measuring Costs from Permitted Gaming: Concepts and Categories in Evaluating Gam-
bling's Consequences, 19J. GAMBLING STUD. 185, 185 (2003).
66. Estimates range at least from $8,600 to $100,000 per year for each pathological
gambler. DUNSTAN, supra note 9; RYAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 95-97 (estimating the social
costs per problem gambler at $10,958 in Louisiana, $8,635 in Wisconsin, and $16,034 in
Connecticut); see also Senator Paul Simon, Gambling Has High Social Costs and Should Be
Restricted by the Government, in LEGALZED GAMBLING, supra note 41, at 211 (noting that esti-
mates range from $13,200 to $30,000 per year for each problem gambler).
67. A study conducted by economist Melissa Schettini Kearney found that, after a state
lottery was introduced, households with incomes in the lowest third lowered their expendi-
tures on food consumed in the home, rent, home mortgage, and other bills. MELISSA
SCHETTINI KEARNEY, STATE LOTTERIES AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.wellesley.edu/Economics/kearney/mskearney-lotteries.pdf (last visited Jan. 2,
2004).
68. Paul H. Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The Law and Economics of Native American Casi-
nos, 78 NEB. L. REV. 263, 271 (1999).
69. John Warren Kindt, Legalized Gambling is Bad for Business, in LEGALIZED GAMBLING,
supra note 41, at 134-50. For a telling criticism of Kindt's work on the social costs of gam-
bling, see William R. Eadington, Comment on "The Costs ofAddicted Gamblers: Should the States
Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?," 22 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 17
(2001).
70. Kindt, supra note 69, at 132-34.
71. Brietzke & Kline, supra note 68, at 268.
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pie, gambling has been cited as a cause of "alcoholism, drug addic-
tion, over-eating, and suicide. 7 2
At the same time, other researchers argue that studies of the so-
cial costs of gambling are riddled with methodological errors and
weakened by the lack of systematic data.73 Opponents of gambling
typically count as costs those transactions that are merely transfers of
money,"4 while omitting from the calculus the primary benefit of gam-
bling-its entertainment value to the gambler.7 5 Although it is easy to
find anecdotal evidence that pathological gambling causes an increase
in crime, suicide, or family problems, it is nonetheless difficult to
prove this connection for many reasons; it is difficult to find and track
reliable data on these problems, and pathological gambling may be
merely one disorder in a set of behavior disorders, not necessarily the
cause of the other disorders.76 It appears that, in this relatively new
field, there is no commonly recognized set of definitions or even
methodology; therefore, it is difficult to determine with any precision
or widespread agreement what gambling's social costs are." There
are so many disputes about the social costs of gambling that the crea-
tion of studies and the rejection of those studies virtually has become
a cottage industry.7"
72. Id. (citing William N. Thompson & Ricardo Gazel, The Last Resort Revisited: The
Spread of Gambling as a "Prisoner's Dilemma," in GAMBLING: PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (William R. Eadington & Judy A. Cornelius eds., 1997)).
73. Walker, supra note 65, at 150.
74. Liz Benston, Expert: Problem Gambling Study Flawed, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 31, 2003,
available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2003/mar/31/
514877368.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
75. Clement, supra note 64 ("[C]asino opponents tend to neglect the very real en-
tertainment value of casinos-millions of consumers voicing their preferences by spending
money on casino gambling .... ).
76. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF GAMBLING: ECONOMIC EFFECTS MORE
MEASURABLE THAN SOCIAL EFFECTS 54 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
gg00078.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
77. Eadington, supra note 20, at 188 ("[S]tudies in this area are fraught with concep-
tual difficulties and are supported by only limited empirical evidence .... Many of the
costs identified are internal to the individual or household, as opposed to external-borne
by society-and are therefore difficult to place into a cost-benefit framework.").
78. See Liz Benston, Critics: Problem Gambling Analysis Flawed, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 25,
2003, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/archives/2003/mar/25/
514851534.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2004) (noting a study by UNLV professors William
Thompson and Keith Schwer, which estimated that addicted gamblers in Southern Nevada
cost between $300 million to $470 million per year, approximately $8000 per problem
gambler per year-a claim disputed by economist Douglas Walker). Walker had previously
published a critique of a 1996 study conducted by Thompson and is expected to publish a
critique of this latest study as well. Id.
2004]
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Similarly, there is dispute about how to calculate the positive eco-
nomic effects of legalized gambling. 79 States have claimed that casino
gambling not only generates revenue for the states, but it also has
"lowered their unemployment rates, decreased their welfare and
other subsidy payments, and revitalized local economies."8 Other
claimed benefits include the development of tourism, the revitaliza-
tion of a waterfront or urban area, and aid to an underprivileged or
otherwise needy group.8 These claims and the studies upon which
the states have relied have been challenged.82 Even when casinos cre-
ate jobs, they may not be improving the local employment conditions
if the casinos are hiring workers from outside the local area or where
they are merely cannibalizing other local industries.83
Gambling might also have positive health benefits, providing not
only a form of adult entertainment, but also a means of social interac-
tion for adults, especially older adults who have fewer recreational al-
ternatives.84 Gambling could even act as "a buffer against the
development or progression of mental health problems" by
"catch [ing]" people before they become unstable, "occupying their
attention and shifting their subjective focus."8 5 This distraction may
prevent them from becoming even more disordered.86
In the past, states have taken a patriarchal approach in determin-
ing whether gambling is in the best interests of their citizens, normally
79. See Grinols & Mustard, supra note 49, at 143-44 (noting the disagreements over
which factors should be counted as costs and benefits in studies on gambling).
80. NATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR GAMING STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 46, at 11.
81. Eadington, supra note 20, at 186.
82. See, e.g., Grinols & Mustard, supra note 49, at 143 (noting that "[m]any studies pay a
great deal of attention, for example, to estimating the number of direct and indirect jobs
that casinos create and to tallying the taxes casinos pay, but do not explain the social value
of an additional job or calculate the lost taxes of competing non-casino businesses"); Ead-
ington, supra note 20, at 187 (noting that "the methodology to distinguish fully between
absolute measures of economic impacts and incremental impacts-in comparison to what
would have taken place in absence of casino authorization-is still in need of considerable
refinement").
83. GARRETr, supra note 15, at 24. Garrett's study concluded that casinos increased
employment in three of four rural counties studied, though the effect was harder to detect
for metropolitan counties. Id. at 23.
84. David A. Korn & HowardJ. Shaffer, Gambling and the Health of the Public: Adopting a
Public Health Perspective, 15J. GAMBLING STUD. 289, 294-95 (1999). Korn and Shaffer note
that gambling "can be viewed as a form of adult play," and that "seniors also may represent
a population segment that receives considerable health benefit from their gambling activ-
ity." Ild. at 325, 339.




opting to ban it.8 7 This approach suffers from the flawed information
gathering methodology needed to determine whether gambling will
harm the state's citizens.88 On the other hand, the alternative ap-
proach-allowing individual gamblers to decide whether and how
much to gamble-permits gamblers to determine the extent of their
participation by making their own personal cost-benefit analyses."9
For these personal cost-benefit analyses to be most efficient, however,
and free of the informational flaws from which the statewide cost-ben-
efit analyses suffer, individuals need clear, accurate, and, timely infor-
mation about the price of their gambling opportunities.
Although states have often sought to capitalize on the increase of
gambling within their borders, they have done distressingly little to
aid problem or pathological gamblers.9" Some states have imple-
mented self-exclusion programs, designed to allow problem gamblers
to bar themselves from casinos.9 The states that benefit most from
gambling, Nevada and New Jersey, unsurprisingly have the weakest
self-exclusion programs.92 While states harvest their share of money
lost by problem gamblers, they spend too little of it on programs to
treat these gamblers.93 Nevada "has never spent a dime on treatment
for problem gamblers,"94 and even a legislative effort to provide such
funding currently would earmark only $250,000-a pittance. 95 Dela-
ware applies only 1% of its income from gambling to treat problem
gamblers, though the resulting $1.25 million was significantly more
than New Jersey's $700,000 in such expenditures.9 6 Maryland, even
though it was the first state to fund gambling addiction treatment pro-
grams, ceased all funding for such programs in 2002.17 New York re-
87. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (noting that most states banned gam-
bling up until 1976).
88. See supra notes 73-78 (discussing the difficulties in conducting accurate studies on
the social cost of gambling).
89. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text (explaining how the government
does not provide effective information to gamblers to assist in consumer cost-benefit
analysis).
90. For a discussion of self-exclusion programs, see Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and
COying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36
LoYoLA L. REv. 693 (2003).
91. See id. at 748-58 (discussing self-exclusion programs in the gaming industry).
92. See id. at 748 n.217 (noting the self-exclusion programs in a number of states).
93. See, e.g., Liz Benston, Nevada Problem Gambling Program Launches Today, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Mar. 11, 2003, at 1.
94. Id. (quoting Bo Bernhard, assistant professor of hotel management at the Univer-
sity of Nevada, Las Vegas).
95. But see id. (stating that $250,000 is a step in the right direction).




portedly spent just $1.7 million on treatment and education for
gamblers, while selling $4.75 billion in lottery tickets.9" Even though
the State of New York has become a "full-blown bazaar of television,
radio and billboard ads for lotteries, casinos, Quick Draw and horse
racing," New York, in 2003, had only seven state-dedicated gambling
treatment programs.9" Although the number and popularity of pro-
fessional treatment programs targeted at pathological gamblers are
growing,100 there are few residential gambling treatment centers
across the nation. 1° 1
IV. CALCULATING THE AVERAGE PRICE OF A WAGER
Although gambling opportunities and the risk of problem gam-
bling have multiplied throughout the country, so far no governmental
entity has taken a seemingly basic step toward helping people control
their gambling, requiring casinos and other slot machine operators to
disclose accurate, clear, and timely price information regarding their
product.' 0 2 Before any discussion of how to disclose the true cost of
gambling or the effect of such disclosure, it is first necessary to under-
stand how to calculate that cost. 10 3 The average cost of any wager can
be expressed as either the average percentage of each bet the gambler
loses and hence, the casino wins, or as the average amount lost by the
gambler for a bet of a given size.' 0 4 If on a given game, on average, a
gambler loses one dollar for each ten dollars bet, then the average
percentage lost is 10% and the average amount lost on a ten dollar bet
is one dollar. To this average price should be added any transaction
98. Kate Gurnett, Hidden Addiction, Scant Treatment, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan.
13, 2003, at Al (quoting James Maney, executive director of the New York Council on
Problem Gambling).
99. Kate Gurnett, Gambling Fever Ups the Ante, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 12,
2003, at Al.
100. Nancy M. Petry, Patterns and Correlates of Gamblers Anonymous Attendance in Pathologi-
cal Gamblers Seeking Professional Treatment, 28 ADDICTrVE BEHAVS. 1049, 1050 (2003).
101. Gurnett, supra note 98.
102. See infra notes 147-155 (noting that even the casinos do not typically voluntarily
release accurate price information and the government does not require any such
disclosures).
103. See ROBERT C. HANNUM & ANTHONY N. CABOT, PRACTICAL CASINO MATH (2001) (dis-
cussing the underlying mathematics of casino games, the odds associated with the games,
and the use of mathematics in casino gaming management).
104. Id. at 9. To calculate the average cost of or loss from a simple gamble, one would
multiply the probability of winning by the value of the money that could be won and then
subtract that total from the amount bet. Id For example, if a dollar slot machine provided
a one in a thousand chance of winning $900, then the slot machine would return on aver-
age $900 for each $1,000 dollar bet or ninety cents on the dollar. Id. This leaves a 10%
average expected profit for the house and loss for the gambler. Id.; seeJAMES WALSH, TRUE
ODDS 34244 (1996) (explaining how to calculate expected value in the gambling context).
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costs or other indirect costs in order to obtain the total cost of the
wager.' 5 The average percentage lost is referred to as the "house ad-
vantage," the "house edge," or the "hold percentage." Most casino
games are designed to have an average rate of loss built into the
game-the average percentage of wagers that a gambler can, in the-
ory, expect to lose during the course of wagering, though actual losses
may vary dramatically from the theoretical average loss rate. The the-
oretical average loss percentage in table games is referred to as the
"house advantage" or "house edge." For slot machines, it is referred
to as the "hold percentage," though the term "hold percentage" has a
completely different, more arcane meaning in table games.' °6 Be-
cause this article focuses on consumer protection in slot machines
and other electronic games, it uses the term "hold percentage" gener-
105. Melissa Schettini Kearney, State Lotteries and Consumer Behavior 8 (Sept. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.wellesley.edu/Economics/kearney/mskearney-lotteries-9-03.pdf.
106. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 10. The term "hold percentage" has differing
meanings. See id. at 37-56. Much of the terminology used to describe casinos' pricing
suffers from twin flaws. The terms are used inconsistently, with different meanings as-
signed to the same term and different terms having the same meaning. Furthermore, the
terminology is framed from the point of view of the casinos, calling the average losses of
gamblers the "win percentage," for example. In this Article, I am reconstructing that ter-
minology to be more consistent and to focus on the consumer in order to further the goal
of consumer protection. The New Mexico Gaming Control Board rules define "hold per-
centage" to be "the percent of coins or credits played that are retained by the gaming
machine; it is determined by subtracting the payback percentage from 100%." N.M. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 15, § 1.8.7(K) (2003). Hannum and Cabot define the hold percentage not
as the percentage that a casino would win, on average from each bet, but rather the per-
centage that, on average, a casino would win from the "drop," which is the amount that the
player is prepared to put at risk in a game. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 43-45. In
many table games, the exact amount of the bet is not tracked by casinos, as they have no
way of monitoring the flow of chips between dealers and players. See id. at 38 (explaining
that casinos "must rely on limited or less-than-perfect information to do its analyses"). For
some table games such as blackjack, the hold percentage, as defined by Cabot and Han-
num, may differ substantially from the house advantage because players may regamble
winnings or may not ever wager all of their drop. Id. at 43-45. For slot machines and other
electronic games, however, the drop is defined by how much a player actually wagers, and
so the hold percentage and the house advantage are the same. Id. at 42-43. One can also
distinguish between the theoretical hold percentage, which is the percentage the slot ma-
chine is designed to withhold on average, and the actual hold percentage, which is the
percentage a machine has withheld during some past period. Because my analysis concen-
trates on warnings for slot machines, for the purposes of this Article, "hold percentage" will
be used generally to indicate the theoretical percentage of coins or money on average
retained by the machine. Also, a standardization of gambling terms is required to disclose
prices to consumers. I have chosen "hold percentage" over the optional terms, "house
advantage" and "house edge," because I think it best communicates the concept that the
casino is, typically, holding that money and not returning it. Moreover, using "hold per-
centage" allows me to create the alternative term "hold amount" to express the average loss
in a specific sum. The gaming industry should create a better term for the old Hannum-
Cabot definition of hold percentage defined as the percentage of the drop won by the
casino. One possibility is calling it the "win-drop percentage."
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ally to mean the rate of theoretical average loss faced by gamblers in
those games. Too often, the cost of slot machines is expressed in a
more confusing manner, in terms of a "payback percentage," which is
the percentage of the bet that is on average returned to the
gambler. 107
I define the "hold amount" as the average sum, not percentage,
of money a gambler will lose from a bet of a particular size, such as ten
cents from a dollar bet. The true cost of a particular wager can, thus,
be expressed either as a hold percentage or a hold amount.' °8 Many
gamblers have difficulty understanding that the effective average price
of any wager is the hold amount, as such an understanding is, to some
extent, counter-intuitive.'0 9 The price of a dollar slot machine ap-
pears to be a dollar, and what is purchased is a chance at some win-
nings. This impression, however, ignores the fact that the product
involves the return of money.1" 0 The average net price of a dollar slot
machine is not one dollar; rather, it is the amount on average that the
casino does not return from the dollar, or the hold amount.'
107. For example, the rules and regulations of the New Mexico Gaming Control Board
define "payback percentage" as "the theoretical percentage that will be won by a player
during a cycle of play on the machine." N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 1.8.7(N) (2003). The
payback percentage can be calculated by subtracting the hold percentage from 100%, as
the average amount of the player's wager that is not returned to the player constitutes the
player's average losses. Jeffrey E. Milligan, Statistical Verification Techniques for Discovering Slot
Machine Malfunctions and Theft, in GAMBLING AND COMMERCIAL GAMING: ESSAYS IN BUSINESS,
ECONOMICS, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 171, 172-73 (William R. Eadington & Judy A. Corne-
lius eds., 1992).
108. FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 20.
A casino deals in financial transactions, and it earns its profit by charging custom-
ers a fee for the privilege of participating in each gambling transaction. This fee
is not a set amount taken out of every wager . . . . Instead, it is the average
amount that statistical analysis predicts will be taken out of a great number of
wagers, and this average percentage is called the casino advantage.
Id. The hold amount of a bet is equal to the bet's expected value to the casino, as it is how
much a casino can expect to win on average on a bet of a given size. HANNUM & CABOT,
supra note 103, at 35.
109. "The price of casino gaming is frequently a matter of some confusion .... The
average, or effective, price of gambling is thus the edge for each bet or slot machine
weighted by the total handle, or amount wagered, on each bet or slot machine." VICKI ABT
ET AL., THE BUSINESS OF RISK: COMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA 74-75
(1985). By "edge," the authors are referring to the hold percentage. Id. at 74.
110. One way to conceptualize the price of gambling is to imagine an ice cream vendor
who decides to liven up his business by varying his prices. To buy a cone, a purchaser must
give the vendor a $10 bill. Sometimes the vendor gives no change back, sometimes $5,
sometimes $10 sometimes even $20 in change. On average, however, the vendor gives
back exactly $9 in change. Most people would conclude that the ice cream costs on aver-
age $1, even though the initial stake the purchasers must tender is $10.
111. ABT ET AL., supra note 109, at 262.
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One of the reasons that the hold percentage is so seldomly dis-
cussed, in addition to casinos' natural reluctance to detail their cus-
tomers' losses, is the difficulty in mentally calculating this
percentage.' 1 2 The hold percentage for a slot-machine wager is equal
to the sum of all of the possible amounts that a casino could either
win or lose, each multiplied by the possibility of that particular win or
loss, with the resulting number divided by the amount wagered and
then multiplied by one hundred.113 For casinos or other gambling
operations to turn a profit, naturally the overall hold percentage of
the games offered must be a positive number.114
V. THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE PRICE DISCLOSURE
FOR SLOT MACHINES
The amount of price information available to gamblers varies dra-
matically by the type of casino game offered." 5 For most standard
casino games, notably card games such as blackjack and poker, there
is a ready market supplying information regarding the odds of the
particular game.' 16 A game like video poker, with a complicated table
of returns for each possible winning hand, is much more difficult to
parse and to calculate the exact hold percentage.' 7 However, gam-
112. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty in calculating
the hold percentage).
113. In mathematical terms, the hold percentage for a slot-machine wager may be ex-
pressed as follows: Theoretical Slot-Hold Percentage = 100*(Xi (Net Payi × Pi)) / Amount
Wagered. "*" is used as a multiplication sign, "i" means the summation of all the follow-
ing equations for each possible value, "Net Payi" is each possible win or loss amount for a
casino that a game might render, and "Pi" is the probability of that particular win or loss
amount. This formula is adapted from HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 35. For a
related formulation of the hold percentage, see Milligan, supra note 107, at 177.
114. The total amount bet, ignoring how much is won or lost, is referred to as the "han-
dle." FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 21. By comparison, the "drop" is the amount of the
customer's money that they are willing to wager. Id. at 18. For example, if a customer
walks into a casino with $100 and plays slot machines until he loses his entire stake, the
drop from that gambler will be $100. The handle will likely be far greater, as he will
probably have won at least some of his bets and then rebet those winnings.
115. See ANTHONY N. CABOT, CASINO GAMBLING: POLICY, ECONOMICS, AND REGULATION 90
(1996) (noting that "availability of information in the casino industry is uneven").
116. Cabot notes that "[1]iterally hundreds of books are available that provide detailed
information to gamblers as to the odds of every casino game based on individual casino
rules. If gamblers do not like the game that the casino offers, gamblers can either go
elsewhere or not play." Id.
117. Glenn Weber & W. Todd Scruggs, A Mathematical and Computer Analysis of Video
Poker, in GAMBLING AND COMMERCIAL GAMING: ESSAYS IN BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, PHILOSOPHY
AND SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 625-33 (discussing the difficulty inherent in determining
the exact payback percentage in video poker). The authors combined a mathematical
analysis of video poker with a computer simulation of 500 million video poker games.
They were unable to reach a final conclusion about how the common higher payout for
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blers can purchase computer aids that inform them of the payback
rate of any video poker game for "perfect play," so long as the gambler
can punch in the pay-offs for each winning hand.t" 8 Although few
players can achieve perfect play, given the limitations on their abili-
ties, their time, or their bankroll, the player can at least obtain some
idea of how the individual machine compares to other machines that
the player might use." 9 Casinos, of course, have strategies to counter
players' attempts to calculate the hold rate of video poker and have
introduced pay tables that appear to be looser, but have hidden costs
unfamiliar to many players. 120
Unlike other gamblers, even the most sophisticated and knowl-
edgeable slot machine players typically cannot determine the average
expected price of their game. 121 Unlike blackjack, craps, or roulette,
the odds of winning in slot machines are not inherent in the structure
of the machines. 22 While blackjack necessarily involves fifty-two cards
with predetermined functions, computer-driven slot machines de-
pend on a random number generator, with each possible number
from a range that may be in the billions corresponding to a distinct
combination of symbols that then appear on the machine's virtual
reels.' 23 Even if a gambler knew how many stops there were on each
virtual wheel, which exact symbols were on each virtual stop, and the
chances of landing on each stop, determining the exact hold percent-
age for an individual slot machine would require more extensive pow-
Royal Flushes, occurring when the player inserts the maximum amount of coins allowed
per hand, would affect the optimal return. Id. at 625, 632.
118. See Bob Dancer &Jeffrey Compton, Writers Explain Common Gaming Terminology, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J.,July 13, 2001, at 31J (defining terminology pertaining to gambling pay sched-
ules). "Perfect play" does not require the player to be omniscient, precisely determining
which cards should be held or discarded. See id. Rather, it means that the player holds or
discards individual cards based statistically on which hold will maximize the player's re-
turns given the uncertainty of what new cards will be dealt. See id.
119. See BASIL NESTOR, THE UNOFFICIAL GUIDE TO CASINO GAMBLING 68-69 (1999)
(describing the difficulty in achieving perfect play in video poker).
120. Id. at 67. Nestor states:
In the early days of video poker when these three games were most common it
was easy to look for a 9/6, settle for 8/5 and avoid 6/5. This clarity made some
machines less popular so casinos countered with measures to muddy the water
.... These days more than four dozen versions of video poker can be found with
paybacks ranging from 91% to 100% and occasionally higher .... The result of
so many choices is that the traditional wisdom of looking primarily for a 9/6
Jacks-or-Better machine doesn't work so well anymore.
Id.
121. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 209.
122. See infra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty in ascer-
taining slot machine returns).
123. NESTOR, supra note 119, at 44.
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ers of calculation than most slot players possess.' 24 Without knowing
how many virtual stops a slot machine has as well as how many of each
type of symbol each stop contains, a gambler cannot determine the
true price of a slot machine. 1
25
With today's computer-driven slot machines, casinos can alter the
likelihood that any particular symbol will appear. 26 This advanced
technology of computer-driven slot machines "makes it possible to
have identical machines with different rates of return, " t 2 7 and it is vir-
tually impossible, without help from the casino or the manufacturer,
for the consumer to learn how any individual slot machine is set.'2 1
Of course, the manufacturer and casino have some obligations con-
cerning the manufacture and operation of their machinery, but the
regulations in place do surprisingly little to inform the consumer of
the true cost of playing an individual slot machine. 129
This price information is crucial to gamblers because of the great
range of prices available in slot machines across the country, varying
as much as from 0.5% to 30% or even more, meaning that one ma-
chine could cost sixty times as much as another machine without the
consumer being notified of the price differential. 0 If the consumer
enjoys playing the slot machines so much that it would be worth an
expected average loss of $20 per hour to play, the consumer often has
no way of knowing whether his expected average loss would be more
or less than that amount."' A dollar slot player could face average
losses of $2.50 per hour to $150 per hour or more without any disclo-
sure of the different prices.1 3
2
124. See, e.g., Milligan, supra note 107, at 172-74 (considering the difficult calculations
required to determine the hold percentage of even a simple slot machine with twenty-two
stops, three reels, and one pay line).
125. Anthony N. Cabot & Robert C. Hannum, Gaming Regulation and Mathematics: A Mar-
iage of Necessity, 35J. MARSHALL L. REV. 333, 341 (2002).
126. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 59 ("Since traditional spinning reel machines
are no longer mechanical but controlled by computer microchips like video 'reel' ma-
chines, they also can be programmed for virtually any number of 'stops,' any hit frequency,
and any house advantage within the limits of applicable regulations.").
127. NESTOR, supra note 119, at 44.
128. CABOT, supra note 115, at 421.
129. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 14, § 14.040(1) (2002) (noting that all gaming de-
vices must be set to have no greater than a 25% hold percentage or 75% payback percent-
age). Most Nevada slot machines have a much smaller hold percentage, but casinos are
not required to disclose how much smaller. Id.
130. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 61.
131. CABOT, supra note 115, at 90.
132. Playing five hundred times an hour for $1 per attempt, a player on a 0.5% machine
would on average lose $2.50 per hour, while one on a 30% machine would on average lose
$150 an hour, a price differential that would clearly affect most players' willingness to play.
Hannum and Cabot estimate that casinos can expect slot machine players to average
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Manufacturers of slot machines can exactly determine a particu-
lar machine's hold percentage and pass that information on to casi-
nos. 13  Slot machine players cannot obtain even a rough idea of an
individual machine's hold percentage without playing it for an im-
mense number of games.1 34 Furthermore, casinos can easily manipu-
late the payout distributions of their machines to mislead players
regarding which machines are looser or tighter. 135 For example, casi-
nos can increase the "payoff frequency," also called the "hit percent-
age," of their machines, which is "probability of receiving some type of
payoff on a given handle pull." '36 The "hit percentage" can be in-
creased without altering the hold percentage of the machine, 137
merely by increasing the frequency of small pay-offs.138 Because play-
ers would receive more regular payouts from machines with higher hit
percentages, they might perceive those machines to be looser even
though the hold percentages might even be higher and the gambler,
on average, would be losing more money.'3 9
Some casinos publicly display the payback percentages of a select
few of their individual machines, often ones with hold percentages
significantly lower than other machines of the same denomination. 140
While casinos sometimes advertise the overall pay-off rates of their slot
machines, they often do so in terms of saying that the slot machines
have payback percentages "up to 97[%]. '' 41 Clearly, "up to 97[%]"
roughly five hundred wagers per hour. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 63, 171. A
fast player could obtain almost a thousand wagers per hour on a slot machine. Grochow-
ski, supra note 56.
133. An executive officer of a slot machine manufacturer stated that his company uses a
public domain random number generator "that has been well documented and thor-
oughly tested by many mathematicians, in addition to being thoroughly tested in house...
[therefore] when we make a 97.2% payback machine, we know it is truly a 97.2% payback
machine." Amy Higgins, Ka-chin., MACHINE DESIGN, Jan. 9, 2003, at 75.
134. See supra notes 126-128 (explaining the difficulty in calculating payout).
135. Id.
136. FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 298.
137. John Grochowski, Video Slots Take Sting out of a Losing Night, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 6,
2000, at 1; see also HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 63, 71-72 (discussing the payout
distributions for three slot machines with dramatically different hit percentages but nearly
identical hold percentages).
138. FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 298.
139. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 71.
140. See, e.g., STEVE BOURIE, AMERICAN CASINO GUIDE 36 (2003 ed.) (detailing an inter-
view of Tom Reale, Director of Slot Operations at the Sands in Atlantic City). Reale states
that his casino has about three dozen machines "located in a particular area and.., clearly
marked as an advertisement" that have a hold percentage of less than 2%, even though
90% of the quarter machines in the casino are set to have an hold percentage of about 9%,
or more than four times as much. Id.
141. LARRY MAR, SECRETS OF MODERN SLOT PLA'qNG 7 (3d ed. 2001).
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also leaves the possibility of payback percentages as low as the legal
minimum, which in Nevada is 75%.142 Other advertising is even more
vague.143 For example, casinos "advertise they have 'looser slots' than
their competitors down the street.' 4 4 Clearly, this is intended to im-
ply that the slot machines have a generous pay-out rate, or even the
best pay-out rate locally, but this advertising is so vague that if called
on the accuracy of it, the casino operator could easily defend the ad-
vertising as mere "puffing,"1 45 as it is a difficult claim to prove or
disprove. 1
46
Although casinos appear eager to claim the mantle of having "the
loosest slots in town," they appear significantly less interested in adver-
tising the exact hold percentages of their slots on a general basis. 14 7
From the time of the legalization of casino gambling until the year
2000, casinos in New Jersey were barred by state regulation from ad-
vertising the hold percentage or payback percentages of their slot ma-
chines.' 48 Casinos had lobbied to retain this restriction, because it
prevented them from having to compete with each other in terms of
price of their products.149 When the U.S. Supreme Court subse-
142. NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 14, § 14.040(1) 9 (2002).
143. One casino abruptly changed its advertised payback rate from 98% to 94%. John
Grochowski, Post-Cruising Boats Use Same Payback, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at 25. Ap-
parently, the 98% payback referred only to a "single small bank of $1 slot machines," while
the 94% applied to all of the casino's machines in two locations in the aggregate. Id.
144. Laura Watt, Seniors'Buck Stops at Casinos, DENV. POST, Apr. 30, 2000, at E01. "'Loos-
est slots' is industry jargon for slot machines with the most generous jackpot payouts to
players." Rick Alm, Harrah 's Grabs Largest Kansas City, Mo., Casino Market Share in November,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TPiB. Bus. NEWS, Dec. 13, 2000, at 2.
145. CABOT, supra note 115, at 91. Casinos are not completely free to engage in exces-
sive puffery. For instance, Sam's Town, a Nevada casino, ran an advertisement declaring,
"Figures released by the Gaming Control Board confirm what smart players already know
that, on average, the slots at Sam's Town are much looser than those found on the Strip or
Downtown Las Vegas." Jeff Simpson, Sam's Town Investigated: Regulators question loose-slot
ads, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Apr. 14, 2001, at 3D. This advertisement caused Nevada gaming
regulators to initiate an investigation of its veracity, because the Nevada Gaming Control
Board, unlike its Illinois counterpart, does not release casino by casino statistics on the
hold percentages of slot machines, apparently preferring to keep consumers in the dark as
to where the "loosest slots in town" are. Id.
146. David Flaum, Sheraton Rejiggering Slots to Boost Payoffs, Business; Gambit Follows Dip in
Earnings, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Dec. 14, 2001, at CI (quoting Eric Hausler, an
analyst for Bear Stearns & Co.).
147. See MichaelJ. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure
in Markets, 19J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 46 (2003) (arguing that sellers are unlikely to volun-
tarily disclose information about their products when the portion of customers who can
understand the disclosures is low).
148. PatrickJenkins, New Jersey Lifts Outdated Ban on Casino Slot Ads, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB.
Bus. NEWS, July 7, 2000, at 1.
149. The Associated Press, State Will Allow Casinos to Advertise Their Odds, THE REC. N.
N.J., June 17, 2000, at A14.
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quently overturned some restrictions of gambling advertising in states
where the gambling itself was legal, 5 ' New Jersey regulators con-
cluded that their ban on slot machine payback percentages was also
constitutionally suspect and rescinded this restriction.15' Many in the
industry worried that lifting this restriction would cause a price war
among the casinos in Atlantic City, in which they would advertise slot
machine payback percentages favorable to the consumer in an effort
to gain a greater market share.15 2 One casino executive stated that
lifting these restrictions "could make the industry that much more
competitive and could start an odds war."' 53 This price war never ma-
terialized, the slot machine payouts for a six-month period rose in line
with the industry's historical practice and only a few casinos actually
advertised their percent returns.'54 If casinos are loath to reveal their
average slot machine hold percentages, they are even less apt to reveal
the hold percentages on specific machines.155
In addition to the limited information provided by casino adver-
tising, some information is publicly available regarding the general
hold percentages of various casinos.156 Several states provide some
information regarding electronic gaming machine payback percent-
ages, though rarely in a form useful to consumers. 157 For example,
the state of Illinois has published monthly reports of its casino indus-
try, including the aggregate adjusted gross receipts to handle ratio of
various denominations of slot machines for various casinos around the
State.' 58 The information has been presented in a manner difficult
for a consumer to understand, referring, for example, to the "EGD
150. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
151. Jenkins, supra note 148, at 1.
152. Associated Press, supra note 149.
153. Id.
154. Joe Weinert, Atlantic City Payout War Never Materialized, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 1,
2001, at 3D. According to a high-ranking officer in a major casino operation, "Based on
our experience in other jurisdictions, quoting odds is not a defensible competitive strategy.
If you get into a battle with a competitor, no one wins." Jenkins, supra note 148, at 1
(quoting Timothy Wilmot, eastern division president of Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.).
Michael Pollock, publisher of MICHAEL POLLOCK'S GAMING INDUSTRY OBSERVER, noted,
'You don't see a lot of odds advertising in Las Vegas, particularly among the larger proper-
ties, because it's not a way to advance your brand or really gain permanent healthy market
share." Id.; see also Lisa Monti, If Those Casino Ads Touting Loose Slot .... ASSOCIATED PRESS
POL. SERV., Mar. 30, 1997, at 3 (reporting that a casino official expressed a common indus-
try attitude when he stated that no useful goal is achieved by advertising pay-backs).
155. AVERY CARDOZA, SECRETS OF WINNING SLOTS 75 (1998).
156. See infra notes 158-171 and accompanying text (describing the publicly available,
but unhelpful, information on hold percentages).
157. Id.
158. Examples of these monthly reports can be found at the Illinois Gaming Board web
page at http://www.igb.state.il.us/revreports (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
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AGR to Handle Percentages," which may mean little to novice play-
ers. 159 As of 2003, the State of Indiana provided the "coin in" and
"win" amounts for various casinos, but did not include a calculation of
the average payback percentage or hold percentage, forcing a con-
sumer to do the calculations. 160 By comparison, Nevada, the gaming
capital of the United States, does not break down the information it
provides the public by casino, and instead has only noted the average
payback ratios for all of the casinos in a region, such as North Las
Vegas or the Las Vegas Strip, so as to minimize the price-based compe-
tition among adjacent casinos. 161 Nevada has even refused to identify
publicly to which geographical market any particular casino is
assigned. 1
62
This state-provided information is further disseminated in a more
consumer friendly manner in the popular press. 163  Gaming
magazines, both local and national, attempt to track which casinos
and which gaming locations are offering the best payback percentages
on the various denominations of machines.1 64 Annual casino guides
also include recent information on payback percentages.1 65
For several reasons, a gambler should be wary of trusting even the
state-provided information, limited as it is, or the popular guides or
articles that depend on that information, to indicate accurately the
price of slot machines. 166 First of all, the state-provided data has
lumped slot machines together with video poker machines, which typ-
ically provide a higher return to players than slot machines, thus rais-
159. See ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, MONTHLY RIVERBOAT CASINO REPORT, FEBRUARY 2003,
at 6, available at http://www.igb.state.il.us/revreports/igb6022003.pdf (last visited Jan. 6,
2004).
160. See INDIANA GAMING COMM'N, SUMMARY OF WAGERING AND ADMISSION TAX As RE-
PORTED FOR FEBRUARY 2003, available at http://www.in.gov/gaming/reports/revenue/
2003-02-Revenue.html (last visitedJan. 6, 2004). If a consumer studies such a report with a
calculator in hand, she can discern which casinos provided the best odds to electronic
gaming machine players on average. John Grochowski, Gaming Report Reveals Much about
State Boats, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at 27.
161. Jeff Simpson, Different Payouts for Different Places, LAs VEGAS REv.-J.,June 15, 2002, at
ID; see also NEVADA GAMING REVENUES CALENDAR YEAR 2003 ANALYSIS, supra note 37 (noting
the percentage of total win growth on slot machines from 1999-2000).
162. Simpson, supra note 161.
163. See, e.g., Grochowski, supra note 143 (discussing the payback percentages at various
casinos).
164. FRANK SCOBLETE, BREAK THE ONE ARMED BANDITS 49 (1994). For an example of a
chart attempting to list the average payback percentages of many casinos throughout the
United States, see MAK, supra note 141, at 8-10, reprinted from CASINO PLAYER magazine.
165. See BoURIE, supra note 140 (containing sections on each state and noting the infor-
mation which is publicly available concerning payback percentages of slot machines in
each state).
166. Grochowski, supra note 31.
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ing the average return.1 67 This failure to separate the two types of
games gives slot players an artificially reduced perception of average
slot costs. 168 Furthermore, the information that states provide is usu-
ally at least a month old or more and does not reflect any recent
changes made by casinos.' 69 The state does not provide any informa-
tion about the payback percentages of specific machines, so even if a
gambler goes into a casino with the lowest hold percentage, she may
still unwittingly play a machine with a hold percentage well above av-
erage.1 70 As one gambling columnist noted, "The statistics are an im-
perfect road map to the highest paying slots. But they're the only map
we have.
171
This minimal provision of specific, accurate, and timely price in-
formation, however, is still far more comprehensive than that which
can be found regarding gaming machines at most Indian casinos-a
rapidly expanding "industry expected to do more than $13 billion in
business [in 2003]."172 Indian tribes can engage in "Class III," casino-
style gaming only after successfully negotiating a compact governing
how the tribal casinos will be regulated with a state.' 73 Only one of
the top gambling states, Connecticut, requires its Indian casinos to
provide any public information regarding the payback ratios of their
slot machines. 174 Connecticut's information, however, is not broken
down by denomination of slot machine.
Some states will not even tell gamblers whether Indian casinos






172. Rick Green, Casinos Want High(er) Rollers, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 23, 2003, at L8.
Indian gaming is growing at a rapid rate; the "$9.7 billion generated in 2000 represented a
more than two thousand percent increase since the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
was passed in 1988." K. Alexa Koenig, Gambling on Proposition IA: The California Indian Self-
Reliance Amendment, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2002).
173. See Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian
Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47, 52 (2002).
174. Paul Pringle, Players at Indian Slots Have No Clue on Payout, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003,
at B1; see also, e.g., CONN. Div. OF SPECIAL REVENUE, MOHEGAN SUN CASINO SCHEDULE OF
SELECTED VIDEO FACSIMILE/SLOT MACHINE DATA FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1996
THROUGH NOVEMBER 30, 2003, available at http://www.dosr.state.ct.us/PDFFolder/
Mohltl103.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004); see CONN. DIv. OF SPECIAL REVENUE, FoXWOODS
CASINO SCHEDULE OF SELECTED VIDEO FACSIMILE/SLOT MACHINE DATA FOR THE PERIODJAN-
UARY 1, 1993 THROUGH NOVEMBER 30, 2003, available at http://www.dosc.state.ct.us/PDF
Folder/FoxH1103.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
175. The lack of disclosure in Indian casinos leads to ominous announcements in popu-
lar gaming publications. See, e.g., BouRIE, supra note 140, at 208 ("According to officials at
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the fastest growing casino markets, 176 the casinos are not even re-
quired to have a minimum payout, let alone disclose it. 1 77 Addition-
ally, no governmental agency monitors claims about the casinos'
slots.'17  As a result, the slot machines available in California casinos
are likely much more expensive than their Nevada counterparts.17 9
While Nevada slot machines have hold percentages of 10% or less,
perhaps as little as 3%, California casinos' hold percentages have been
estimated to be as high as 30%-or up to ten times as much as many
Nevada machines.' ° Worse yet, it appears that the compacts that Cal-
ifornia has negotiated with its various Indian tribes forbid the State
from providing any information that it discovers about the payout
rates of the slot machines in Indian casinos, even when required to do
so by law.' This utter lack of information is especially troubling
given how quickly the California casino industry is growing, with reve-
nue increasing from $1.5 billion in 1999 to "estimates ranging from $5
billion to more than $8 billion a year [in 2003]."182 According to one
knowledgeable observer, "California in the very near future will be the
gambling capital of the world-not of the U.S.-of the world. '18 3
How desperate gamblers are for accurate slot price information
and how difficult that information is to obtain can be seen in the at-
tempt to pierce the secrecy surrounding slot prices that was under-
taken by Michael Shackleford, a Las Vegas-based gaming consultant
the Kansas State Gaming Agency the terms of the state's compacts with the tribes regarding
the minimum payback amounts on their machines are not a matter of public record and
no information can be released.").
176. While California had in 2003 an estimated 45,000 slot machines in Indian casinos,
a major expansion of tens of thousands more slot machines" is being considered. Green,
supra note 172.




181. Section 7.4.3(a) of the Model Compact provides, "Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of California law, all information and records that the State Gaming Agency obtains,
inspects, or copies pursuant to this Gaming Compact shall be, and remain, the property
solely of the Tribe .... " Section 7.4.3(b) (i) adds, "The State Gaming Agency will exercise
utmost care in the preservation of the confidentiality of any and all information and docu-
ments received from the Tribe, and will apply the highest standards of confidentiality ex-
pected under state law to preserve such information and documents from disclosure." See
California Model Tribal-State Gaming Compact, available at http://www.cgcc.ca.us/gov
site/msdocs/pressrelease_2003/SantaIsabelCompact.doc (last visited Dec. 11, 2003).
182. Liz Benston, Initial Fears of Local Casinos Losing Revenue Appear to Be a False Alarm,
LAs VEGAS SUN, Mar. 2, 2003, at 1.
183. Id. (quoting former California Lt. Gov. Leo McCarthy, who served as a member of
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission).
2004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
who operates a gambling web page.' 8 4 Shackleford claims that a
"mole in the industry" provided him with "par sheets" for certain
nickel slot machines produced by two manufacturers.' 85 From the par
sheets, one could supposedly match the payback percentage program-
med into some machines to certain patterns of symbols that appear on
the reels of those machines. 18 6 Shackleford used the sheets in an at-
tempt to determine the payback percentage of some machines in vari-
ous Las Vegas casinos and published his results.'8 7 While a slot
manufacturer admitted that someone with its specification sheets
could discover the payout percentages of individual machines, it also
claimed that Shackleford's survey was not "100% accurate."'8 8 Critics
are of mixed opinions as to the validity of Shackleford's results.8 9
This difficulty of accurately discovering the average price of Las Vegas
slot machines, even by the most sophisticated and determined re-
searcher, as well as the wide public notice his efforts received, demon-
strates both that there is great interest in the true cost of slot
machines and that this information is not being provided to the
public. 1
90
VI. MANY GAMBLERS, INCLUDING PROBLEM AND PATHOLOGICAL
GAMBLERS, WOULD LIKELY USE AND BENEFIT FROM
GAMBLING PRICE INFORMATION IF IT
WERE PROVIDED EFFECTIVELY
While states rake in their share of earnings from gamblers, they
should also give the gamblers tools to regulate their gambling and
184. See David Flaum, Sheraton Slots Atop List of Nickel Video Payouts; Tunica Ranking Plays
Loose With Data, Critics Say, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Sept. 15, 2002, at GI.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Jeff Simpson, Gambling: Turning 'em Loose, LAS VEGAS R.v.-J., May 19, 2002, at iF,
available at 2002 WL 6875155.
188. Jeff Simpson, Specifications, Computing Help Crack Payoff Code, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., May
19, 2002, at IF, available at 2002 WL 6874959.
189. Flaum, supra note 184. Even Shackleford admits that he would have liked a larger
sample size, and that his results would probably not apply to all of the slot machines availa-
ble in the casinos he researched. See The Associated Press, Slots That Leave You Smiling, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, June 9, 2002, at 8; Flaum, supra note 184.
190. Casinos are typically required to disclose to gamblers the payoff amount if a slot
machine shows a specific winning combination. For example, Nevada's gaming regula-
tions require that a slot machine have an award card displayed at all times that "must
accurately state the award that will be paid . . .when the player obtains a specific win."
NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 2, § 2.060 (2003). Furthermore, any gaming device submitted to the
gaming commission for approval must display the rules of play and payoff schedule. Id.
§ 14.040(4). Telling a consumer the payoff for a specific win or the payoff schedule for all
of the possible ways to win without also informing the consumer of the odds of each possi-
ble win gives the consumer the illusion that the information is complete and accurate.
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avoid excessive gambling. An important tool for both recreational
and problem gamblers would be accurate price information about the
available forms of gambling.
A. Informational Regulation of Gambling
Requiring casinos to disclose hold percentages would be a form
of informational regulation-regulation designed to provide effective
information about the true risks and costs to aid individual decision-
makers. 91 A system of informational remedies differs from both a
command and control regulatory structure, wherein a regulatory body
attempts to govern the decisions with its rule making authority, and a
laissez-faire system, which provides little governmental regulation. 19 2
Cass Sunstein notes that "informational regulation, or regulation
through disclosure, has become one of the most striking develop-
ments in the last generation of American law."1 93
Informational remedies simultaneously maximize the liberty of
individuals to decide for themselves while promoting economic effi-
ciency. 194 Such remedies promote economic efficiency by limiting the
market failures that can be caused by insufficient or too expensive
information or by informational asymmetry between the parties to a
transaction.1 9 5 In addition, informational remedies encourage eco-
nomic efficiency by forcing parties who profit from consumers' igno-
rance to provide information to consumers who have no other cost-
effective method of obtaining this information.196 This effect is par-
ticularly important in situations where such information would dimin-
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 619 (1999). This form of informational regulation is merely
a subset of the total forms identified by Sunstein, who also includes the forced disclosure of
the release of toxic chemicals by private industry as a political check on the industry's
behavior, and governmental release of information to allow the public to monitor govern-
mental decisions regarding, for example, the environment. Id. at 614.
192. Cass Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 653, 658-61 (1993) (arguing the merits of informational remedies on the
grounds of liberty, economic efficiency, and democracy).
193. Sunstein, supra note 191, at 613 (italics omitted).
194. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 655.
195. "[D]isclosure regulation-at least in theory-increases the freedom of consumers
through giving the opportunity to open one's own eyes .... With disclosure regulation,
consumers have relatively greater freedom to control their financial destiny." Christopher
L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the
Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 883 (2003). Peterson also notes that disclosure
regulation, at least in the credit arena, also provides some protection to consumers from
transactions not in their best interest. Id. at 884.
196. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 656 (noting both consumers' incentive to " ' free ride'
on the efforts of others" resulting in a lack of information and poor incentives for manu-
factures to provide information).
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ish the entire market for a particular product, because, in this
situation, an individual supplier would not voluntarily reveal the faults
in its product.'
97
The federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 98 is an obvious prece-
dent for mandating an informational remedy in the gambling indus-
try, as it was designed to solve a similar problem. 99 Because of the
complexity of loan transactions, the documents that embody the
loans, and the nefarious strategies of some lenders, borrowers were
unable to discover the costs of loans or to compare the costs of one
loan against the other.200 To remedy this information shortage
among consumers, TILA requires lenders to divulge to borrowers the
true costs of loans in a standard format, so that would-be borrowers
can shop for loans, compare the costs of different loans offered by the
same or different lenders, and more accurately discern the true cost
of those loans in determining whether to borrow at all.20 TILA's dis-
closure system has its flaws, but the overall system of price information
disclosure has helped borrowers discover the cost of loans and fos-
tered price competition among lenders.20 2
B. The Command and Control Approach to the Regulation of Gambling
In the past, states have often taken the patriarchal, command and
control approach, determining whether gambling is in the best inter-
ests of their citizens and, upon determining that gambling generally
was bad for its citizens, banning gambling.20 ' This approach has sev-
197. Id. at 656.
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000).
199. See id. § 1601 (a) (declaring that TILA's purpose is to "assure a meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms... to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing
and credit card practices").
200. "The time had come for lenders to tell the real story about the cost of credit.
There was considerable confusion in the marketplace about the terms of credit because
lenders did not disclose the details of their transactions in any uniform way." Elwin Grif-
fith, Searching for the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some Problems in the Truth in Lending Act and
Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 265, 266 (2000).
201. Id. at 268.
202. See Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Im-
plied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One
Roof 1993 Wis. L. REV. 13, 39 n.110 (listing various studies that for the most part demon-
strate that Truth in Lending's disclosure requirements have increased consumer knowl-
edge of the true cost of mortgages but that Truth in Lending remains flawed); see also
Peterson, supra note 195, at 903 (concluding that, while TILA has not so far "lived up to its
potential," the disclosure form of consumer protection may yet prove more useful than
other methods).
203. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (noting that most states banned gam-
bling up until 1976).
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eral flaws. 2 4 Banning gambling is too often seen as an all or nothing
decision. 215 Because it determines whether no gambling is better
than gambling generally, this form of state decision-making ignores
the possibility that limited or regulated gambling might be better than
either freely available gambling or no gambling at all. 20 6
Secondly, this command and control method forces the state to
make an overall decision on behalf of all of its citizens about the over-
all costs and benefits of gambling. To attempt this feat, some have
tried to ascertain the complete social costs of gambling as well as its
social benefit, in order to compare the two.20 7 As noted in Part I,
currently there is little agreement on what constitutes the social costs
of gambling, let alone how exactly to measure these costs, and the
personal benefits to gamblers are also not easily measured or factored
into the social cost-benefit analysis.20 8
Banning all gambling also ignores the fact that some people will
gamble regardless of whether gambling is legal. By banning gam-
bling, the state either forces gamblers to leave the state to gamble or
forces them into the black market for gaming. 20 9 Enforcement of
gambling prohibition is often lax, eviscerating the benefits that it is
intended to achieve.210 The state that bans gambling not only loses
gambling taxes, it also provides a ready source of money to organized
crime, which profits from running numbers games and illicit casi-
nos. 2 1 1 Such black market gambling opportunities appear not only
wherever gambling is banned, but also where types of gaming that
gamblers find particularly appealing are banned.2 t2 Thus, even in
states where casino games are readily available, but where it is illegal
204. See WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, LEGALIZED GAMBLING 15 (1994) (asserting that "prohibi-
tion efforts have at times entered the realm of the ridiculous").
205. See id. (discussing several state and city gambling prohibitions).
206. See Shaffer & Korn, supra note 48, at 178 (asserting that "[g]ambling holds poten-
tial direct and oblique benefits for both the individual and the community").
207. See, e.g., supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (detailing the costs and benefits
of gambling).
208. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in identifying
and defining the costs and benefits of gambling).
209. Reuven Brenner, Prohibition of Gambling is Costly and Does Not Achieve Its Intended
Benefits, in LEGALIZED GAMBLING, supra note 41, at 176-79.
210. Id. at 179-81.
211. ROSE, supra note 8, at 171-72.
212. See THOMPSON, supra note 204, at 53 (noting that "[b]y their very nature, legitimate
gambling operations must be capable of satisfying the particulars of public demand or they
will serve only to stimulate more of the activity they are designed to eradicate").
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to gamble on the outcome of college athletics, bookies operating
outside the law do extensive, untaxed, and unregulated business.
213
This argument has been countered by the observation that legal-
ized gambling has not eliminated illegal gambling, and some contend
that it may even contribute to illegal gambling, as it encourages organ-
ized crime figures to move to a state where gambling is legal.214
A blanket ban presumes either that no gambling is beneficial,
that it is all tainted somehow or will lead to bad effects that outweigh
the benefit of gambling, or that there is no effective way of sorting out
the beneficial from the harmful gambling, and so a blanket ban is
justified.211 Such an analysis ignores the argument that individuals
are generally better judges of what is in their best interests, and
presumes that the state can decide better than its citizens whether in-
dividual gambling transactions should take place, thus constituting pa-
ternalism of a fairly rigorous kind.216
C. The Laissez-Faire Approach to the Regulation of Gambling
The opposite of command and control regulation is the laissez-
faire approach, where the state relies on the parties to gambling trans-
actions to regulate themselves and each other, to the extent that they
can or want to do SO. 2 17 Laissez-faire regulation would not inevitably
213. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COM-
MISSION FINAL REPORT 3-10 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/re-
ports.finrpt.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2003) [hereinafter NGISC Final Report].
214. See Rychlak, supra note 4, at 348-49; Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in
the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26J. CORP. L. 225,
260 (2001); see also Lester B. Snyder, Regulation of Legalized Gambling: An Inside View, 12
CONN. L. REv. 665, 666 (1980).
I. Nelson Rose goes so far as to assert, "No serious student of gambling today believes
that legalized gambling hurts organized crime . . . . In fact, there is evidence that the
introduction of a new legal game increases the number of all bettors, including an increase
in the number of people betting illegally." RosE, supra note 8, at 9.
215. See ACIL CONSULTING, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GAMBLING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALY-
SS 6 (July 16, 1999), available at http://www.acilconsulting.com/au/pdf/Supplemen-
tary-Submission.PDF (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (acknowledging that while "many
commentators and researchers . . . consider gambling to be all cost and no benefit ...
[i]gnoring benefits is illogical and absurd").
216. Thaddeus Mason Pope distinguishes two forms of paternalism: paternalism that
seeks to prevent harm to a third party versus paternalism that seeks to prevent harm to the
very party whose liberty is restricted, calling the former "the harm principle" and the latter
paternalism. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The
Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PI-r. L. REv. 419, 427-31 (2000). He further divides
paternalism into hard and soft paternalism, labeling soft paternalism that which seeks to
protect an individual who lacks adequate information, maturity, or freedom to make effec-
tive decisions herself. Id. at 429-31.
217. THOMPSON, supra note 204, at 16. Thompson calls this approach "government tol-
eration" and notes that most charity gaming in the United States is self-regulated, while the
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lead to completely unregulated behavior, as many parties would seek
some private third party to proctor the gambling transaction. 218 A
complete laissez-faire approach to gambling would be, and has been,
detrimental to many gamblers.219 An example of nearly complete lais-
sez-faire regulation of gambling occurred in Nevada after World War
II, when organized crime effectively ran many of the Las Vegas casi-
nos.2 2 0 Nevada did not even have a specific regulatory agency to su-
pervise casinos until 1955, and even when it established a Gaming
Commission to oversee a Gaming Control Board's regulatory enforce-
ment, the Gaming Commission was, for twenty years, "little more than
a rubber stamp. "221 Organized crime was drawn to Las Vegas because
of the massive amounts of cash with which casinos dealt each day,
making the skimming of money from casinos' counting rooms a lucra-
tive, albeit illegal, enterprise. 22
2
The flaws in laissez-faire control of gambling can be seen in the
area where there is least regulation of gambling in the United States,
Internet gambling. 22' Although this genre of gambling is still in its
infancy, and is still experiencing the rapid growth of a new industry,
troubles from the lack of regulation are already appearing. 224 A new
casino website can be purchased for as little as $5000 in Canada. 225
To create a sense of trust in their customers, some Internet casinos
purport to offer accountants' reports certifying the payout percent-
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, passed in 1988, allows self-regulation by tribes for "tradi-
tional Indian games." See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
218. See Guy Calvert, Gambling America: Balancing the Risks of Gambling and Its Regulation,
POLICY ANALYSIS, June 18, 1999, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa349.pdf
(last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (arguing that without governmental regulation, private parties
would seek third party supervision of their gambling transactions, while governmental reg-
ulation invites corruption).
219. See TIMOTHY L. O'BRIEN, BAD BET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GLAMOUR, GLITZ, AND
DANGER OF AMERICA'S GAMBLING INDUSTRY 30-33 (1998) (discussing the pre-regulation cor-
rupt practices of Las Vegas casino owners).
220. Id. In 1980, Alfred N. King, along with the Department of Justice Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, noted that "Las Vegas gambling was conceived in sin and raised
in degradation. Time after time, mob influence or skimming in the Las Vegas casinos has
surfaced, yet the Nevada Gaming Control Commission has done little to rectify the situa-
tion." Alfred N. King, Public Gaming and Public Trust, 12 CONN. L. REV. 740, 758 (1980).
221. O'BRIEN, supra note 219, at 32.
222. Id. at 31.
223. See Joseph M. Kelly, Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 134-50
(2000) (recounting how federal legislators have introduced efforts to prohibit, but not
regulate, Internet gambling).
224. See NGISC Final Report, supra note 213, at 2-16. The report identifies several issues
specifically raised by Internet gambling. Id. For example, the Internet "provides the high-
est level of anonymity for conducting gambling to date," which exacerbates the existing
problems of underage and pathological gambling. Id.
225. Companies Cash in on Cyber-betting, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 6, 2001, at S07.
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226ages of their various games. 6 The cause for potential distrust is obvi-
ous. Any business so inexpensive to enter can also be exited easily,
once it has its hands on sufficient assets of its customers. Unregulated
Internet casinos could become massive Ponzi schemes, paying out
money long enough to generate sufficient trust from their customers,
permitting casinos to accumulate large amounts of money deposited
for wagers before suddenly going out of business.2 2 7
D. The Current "Smoke and Mirrors" Regulation of Gambling
The states most associated with gambling have created a hybrid of
command and control and laissez-faire regulation.228 States like New
Jersey appear to regulate each aspect of casinos' gaming operation,
yet fail utterly to protect consumers in important respects. 229 A state's
apparently extensive regulatory apparatus seems designed to protect
consumers in the casino industry and is intended to maximize con-
sumer trust in the gaming industry.2 ° If the consumers were told that
the system was completely laissez-faire, they might gamble less because
of their concern about being cheated by the casinos. 23 1 However, be-
cause the casinos project an aura of being hyper-regulated, consumers
226. See what purport to be "special reports" by the South African office of Price-
WaterhouseCoopers regarding the payout schedules of Orbital Casino, an Internet casino,
at http://www.orbitalcasino.com/pwc/index.asp?VT=224007185&EventlD=3228 (last vis-
ited Jan. 6, 2003). Of course, any online casino could also easily generate purported "spe-
cial reports" authored by obscure branch offices of accounting firms.
227. See generally Kelly, supra note 223, at 121-71 (discussing means of regulating In-
ternet gambling, including the "wait and see" and the "regulate and tax" approaches).
228. See Snyder, supra note 214, at 666 (alleging that "[s] tate statute books are replete
with laws that are not seriously enforced" and that despite a "declared unanimity for con-
trols, state gaming boards and commissions and other state agencies are, for the most part,
handmaidens and protectors of the industry they are legally charged with regulating in the
public interest").
229. RoSE, supra note 8, at 31 (discussing the lack of gaming regulations in Atlantic City
designed to protect the players' interests).
230. For example, Nevada's Public Policy of the State Concerning Gaming asserts, "Pub-
lic confidence and trust can only be maintained by strict regulation of all persons, loca-
tions, practices, associations and activities related to the operation of licensed gaming
establishments [and] the manufacture, sale or distribution of gaming devices and associ-
ated equipment." Nevada Gaming Control Act, NEV. REV. STAT. 463.0129(c) (2003). New
Jersey states, in a recent report, "[t]he commission establishes the rules of each game. In
this way, every casino plays by the same rules and public confidence in gaming is en-
hanced." N.J. CASINO CONTROL COMM'N, CASINO GAMBLING IN NEW JERSEY 13 (Jan. 1998),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/casinos/njccc.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
231. Cabot and Hannum assert that "the well being of the entire [gambling] industry is
dependent on the public perception that it is fair and honest." Cabot & Hannum, supra
note 125, at 334.
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may be less wary of their own protection, feeling that the state is
watching over them.23 2
In fact, the state itself has a great interest in ensuring that gam-
blers spend their money in casinos, because the state obtains a large
share of the proceeds from gambling.23  Much of states' extensive
regulation is designed to ensure that casinos do not skim off some of
their winnings and deny the states their share of the money.234 Much
of the remaining regulation is designed to protect casinos, rather than
their customers, as casinos have lobbyists to ensure that their voices
are heard, while gamblers have not organized to protect their
interests. 235
The primary consumer protection for gamblers, apart from rules
such as self-exclusion programs and bet maximums designed to aid
problem gamblers, is in rules requiring casinos to be fair and honest
toward gamblers. Yet even these requirements are designed to pro-
vide too little protection to gamblers. An "honest" game is one in
which the game is truly random and the casino cannot unfairly affect
the outcome of the game.23 6 Gaming regulators check for honesty,
for example, by making sure that computerized slot machines meet
exacting confidence standards for randomness.
"Fairness," on the other hand, refers to how much advantage the
casino has over gamblers and whether the casino's games have an ap-
propriate or excessive hold percentage.2 37 The easiest way to ensure
the fairness of a game would be to force casinos to disclose their hold
percentages and allow their customers to decide if the prices of the
game are fair. Instead, states generally merely mandate maximum
hold percentages. However, the maximums they allow are typically so
high, and so much higher than the average hold percentages in the
232. "[C]asinos are seen as institutions as large and as powerful and as regulated as
banks .... " ROSE, supra note 8, at 20.
233. In its 2000 report, the NewJersey Casino Control Commission noted that, "[s]ince
the inception of casino gaming, the Revenue Unit has collected $4.7 billion in Gross Reve-
nue Tax, $952 million in license fees, $10 million in fines, and $34.5 million in Atlantic
City Fund contributions." N.J. CASINO CONTROL COMM'N, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 8, available
at http://www.state/nj.us/casinos/ccc2000annrpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
234. See generally Richard A. Meyer, Accounting for the Winnings-Auditing Gambling Casi-
nos, 12 CONN. L. REv. 809, 809 (1980) (describing the difficulty of auditing casinos); see also
CABOT, supra note 115, at 131 (discussing the auditing and accounting function of casino
regulation to ensure the collection of taxes).
235. ROSE, supra note 8, at 31. Rose cites a 1983 study of Atlantic City gaming regula-
tions in which the study's authors concluded that all of the new regulations benefited the
casinos, not the players. Id.
236. Cabot & Hannum, supra note 125, at 334-35.
237. Id. at 335.
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state, that the hold percentage limits give gamblers too little protec-
tion. For example, a gambler playing a twenty-five dollar slot machine
in Nevada and expecting a hold percentage near the state average of
3.39% would naturally feel cheated to learn the hold percentage of
her machine was the state maximum 25%, or more than seven times
as expensive as she expected.23 8
Given their interest in revenues from gambling, it is no coinci-
dence that states do little to ensure that consumers have adequate in-
formation needed to make informed decisions regarding the true
costs of the games available in casinos. This lack of consumer protec-
tion leaves casinos free to conceal the true costs of slot machines and
other games.
23 9
E. Informational Remedies Would Aid Recreational Gamblers
Recreational gamblers would benefit from informational disclo-
sures by being able to compare the costs of different gambling options
and determining which offers the best value for the gambler.240 As
states open up legal gambling, they abdicate their role in deciding
how much gambling should occur and instead leave this decision to
individual consumers.24 1 However, individual gamblers cannot make
an informed decision without accurate price information as that infor-
mation is crucial to the comparison of different opportunities for the
gambler.242 Whether a gambler would choose to play the slot ma-
chines or to play roulette or even gamble at all might depend on
which game offered a lower house advantage. 243 Whether a gambler
would prefer to play at a certain casino or a different one further
down the street would often be affected by which casinos offer the
238. Id.
239. DARWIN ORTIZ, DARWIN ORTIZ ON CASINO GAMBLING 27 (1986). Ortiz notes, "Casi-
nos are very clever about disguising the house percentage. But it is there in every game."
Id.
240. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text (detailing how price disclosure
would be useful to gamblers).
241. See THOMPSON, supra note 204, at 16 (explaining the "government toleration" ap-
proach to gambling).
242. See Peterson, supra note 195, at 883. Peterson notes:
Without accurate information about the quality and especially the price of any
good, no person can minimize their opportunity costs, since they cannot compare
the value of that product to their next best option. Thus, in a policy system of
private decisionmaking, where individuals act without accurate cost information,
there is no policymaking at all.
Id.




lowest hold percentages on their games. 244 Recreational gamblers
should be given this information so that they can make rational deci-
sions on whether and how to spend their entertainment dollar and so
maximize the efficiency of the gambling industry.245 As Christopher
L. Peterson noted, "[e]fficient market outcomes can only come about
as a result of individuals selecting those product options with the low-
est opportunity costs. ' 2 46 For a market to function efficiently, the par-
ties to exchanges must be sufficiently capable and informed, and their
participation in the exchanges voluntary; and if so, the exchanges
should be efficient and create a net benefit, even though others might
question its value or wisdom. Without price disclosures by casinos,
recreational gamblers have no way of determining whether the bene-
fits they receive from playing slot machines outweigh the costs or even
which slot machines have the lowest opportunity costs, and so the
market functions inefficiently. 247
Despite casinos' failure to disclose price variations in slot ma-
chines, gamblers are still somewhat sensitive to those variations, show-
ing how important price is to gambling consumers. 24" Even though
the slot machine price differentials can be determined only very
roughly, through personal experience or through word of mouth,
there is evidence that regular and local players in Nevada typically
play at casinos with lower hold percentages. 249
F. Informational Remedies Would Likely Help Pathological
and Problem Gamblers
While this informational remedy would benefit recreational gam-
blers, it likely would also be of special aid to problem or pathological
gamblers. A decade ago, it was postulated that, if gamblers could be
244. Id.
245. Peterson, supra note 195, at 882.
246. Id.
247. To Milton Friedman, the test of whether a transaction benefits both parties is
whether the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPI-
TALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962).
248. Eadington, supra note 20, at 181.
249. Id. Eadington notes:
Regular and local players play more frequently than tourists, and probably share
their experiences more than tourists, and as a result are more price sensitive.
Thus, the house advantage tends to be lower for slot machines for casinos that
cater to local players than for those that cater to tourists ....
Id. Eadington notes that Nevada casinos generally have more competition and lower hold
percentages than their Atlantic City counterparts. Id. He also notes that American rou-
lette has about twice the hold percentage as European roulette and is unsurprisingly much
less popular in the United States than in Europe. Id.
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induced to consider the actual amount of money that would likely be
lost during gambling, they would not gamble as much.25° Recent
studies on the effect of truthful information in a gambling setting
have supported this hypothesis and indicate that providing accurate
information about the costs and likelihood of losing may help patho-
logical and problem gamblers control their gambling.25 t
Much theoretical work has been done on why people gamble. 52
Even though almost all commercial gambling opportunities are losing
propositions for gamblers, a significant percentage of gamblers list
"winning money" as an important reason for gambling.253 Some
economists have argued that gambling can be explained by the desire
of some individuals to change their economic station in life, and the
willingness to take on even risky, somewhat unfair bets at a chance for
this change. 254 Others argue that indivisibilities in expenditures and
income lead to a willingness to take on risk.255 In other words, some-
one with the money or income to buy only half of a car or a house
might be willing to risk some of that money to purchase a whole car or
house.25 6 Or people might play the lottery in hopes of avoiding hav-
ing to work, or because they have few attractive investment options.257
Others assert that the goal of gambling is not to maximize expected
value or wealth but merely to be entertained. 258 The primary goal of
250. Griffiths, supra note 57, at 101-20.
251. See infra notes 282-289 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
253. Paul H. Delfabbro & Anthony H. Winefield, Predictors of Irrational Thinking in Regu-
lar Slot Machine Gamblers, 134J. PSYCHOL. 117, 117 (2000).
254. Friedman and Savage state,
[I]ncreases in income that raise the relative position of the consumer unit in its
own class but do not shift the unit out of its class yield diminishing marginal
utility, while increases that shift it into a new class, that give it a new social and
economic status, yield increasing marginal utility.
Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56J. POL. ECON.
279, 298-99 (1948); see also Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, Lotteries, Insurance, and
Star-Shaped Utility Functions, 52 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1990) (discussing the economic theory
of aversion or attraction to risk).
255. See Ng Yew Kwang, Why Do People Buy Lottery Tickets? Choices Involving Risk and the
Indivisibility of Expenditure, 73 J. POL. ECON. 530, 530 (1965).
256. Id.
257. Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv.
71, 103, 106-07. This effect, McCaffery notes, is especially significant given the information
costs imposed in an initial mutual fund or stock investment. Id. at 106-07.
258. "Recreational gambling is no less productive than ten-pin bowling, ballroom danc-
ing, or barbershop singing-all group pastimes that people pursue because they enjoy
them." David Ramsay Steele, Gambling is Productive and Rational, in LEGALIZED GAMBLING,
supra note 41, at 228. Lloyd Cohen argues that a lottery ticket purchaser is likely not trying
to maximize the expected return or marginal utility of her investment, but rather is buying
a chance to dream about a life of fabulous wealth. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Lure of the Lottey,
254 [VOL. 63:217
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many slot machine players may be to play as long as possible on a
given sum of money for the excitement of the game rather than any
financial return.259 Players may be seeking arousal, created by their
own risk-taking, which would explain why most gambling games are
significantly less stimulating when they are not played for money.260
More controversial is the view that gambling stimulates internal brain
chemistry, such as the dopamine system, the body's reward and plea-
sure network. 261' Despite this theoretical work on understanding why
people gamble, until recently there has been only piecemeal research
in the treatment of problem or pathological gambling.262
One of the most promising and well-documented approaches to
understanding and treating pathological gambling is the cognitive ap-
proach.2 63 According to this approach, pathological gambling is the
result, at least in part, of systematic cognitive errors, such as failing to
understand the utter randomness of slot machines, 264 and believing
that the gambler can somehow control the machine despite its ran-
domness.265 Many gamblers have been seen to hold the persistent be-
36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 705, 716-17 (2001); see also WILLEM ALBERT WAGENAAR, PARADOXES
OF GAMBLING BEHAVIOR 10-11 (1988) (discussing the amusement value of gambling).
259. Paul Delfabbro, The Stubborn Logic of Regular Gamblers: Obstacles and Dilemmas in Cog-
nitive Gambling Research, 20 J. GAMBLING STUD. 1, 12 (2004).
260. Robert Ladouceur et al., Video Lottery: Winning Expectancies and Arousal, 98 ADDIC-
TION 733, 734 (2003).
261. According to psychiatrist Dr. Gregory Berns,
Winning in gambling can also hijack the dopamine system .... [C]ompulsive
gamblers seem to have vulnerable dopamine systems. The first time they win,
they get a huge dopamine rush that gets embedded in their memory. They keep
gambling, and the occasional dopamine rush of winning overrides their con-
scious knowledge that they will lose in the long run.
Sandra Blakeslee, Hijacking the Brain Circuits With a Nickel Slot Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2002, at Fl. Recent research suggests that "dopamine is elevated during gambling in a
manner that is dependent on both the probability and magnitude of potential reward."
Christopher D. Fiorillo et al., Discrete Coding of Reward Probability and Uncertainty by Dopamine
Neurons, 299 Sci. MAG., Mar. 21, 2003, at 1898, 1901.
262. See, e.g., Louise Sharpe & Nicholas Tarrier, A Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Approach
for Problem Gambling, 6J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY 193, 193 (1992); see also Nancy M. Petry
& Christopher Armentano, Prevalence, Assessment, and Treatment of Pathological Gambling: A
Review, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1021, 1021 (1999) (stating that "relatively little effort has
been dedicated to identifying and treating" pathological gambling).
263. Francine Ferland et al., Prevention of Problem Gambling: Modifying Misconceptions and
Increasing Knowledge, 18J. GAMBLING STUD. 19, 20 (2002).
264. Robert Ladouceur & Dominique Dube, Monetary Incentive and Erroneous Perceptions
in American Roulette, 34 PSYCHOL. J. HUM. BEHAV. 27, 30 (1997) (stating that "[t]he present
results revealed that the majority of individuals have erroneous perceptions of events gov-
erned by chance when engaging in gambling activities").
265. Ferland et al., supra note 263, at 19, 20. It should be stressed that even the re-
searchers advocating a cognitive approach to problem gambling do not typically assert it as
a sole basis, but rather merely one of several bases for problem gambling. See Robert B.
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lief that they can somehow control random events. 2 66 This illusion of
control is related to the similar defective heuristic of biased attribu-
tion, where a gambler believes that her own internal characteristics,
such as skill, are responsible for wins, while losses are caused by exter-
nal factors.26 7 A leading theory regarding the cause of problem gam-
bling, the social-cognitive theory, holds that gamblers' erroneous
thoughts about randomness and gamblers' inability to control the re-
sults of their gambling are at the heart of the problem. 268 Although
there is not yet hard proof that erroneous beliefs increase gambling, a
significant number of studies at least indirectly support the theory that
misperception of control increases the frequency of gambling, 269 and
that erroneous beliefs about gambling "may encourage the wagering
of higher amounts of money and persistence at gambling despite con-
sistently losing. '27 0 People have even been shown to gamble more
when exposed to others' erroneous verbalizations about gambling.
27
'
A common error is the gambler's fallacy, the expectation that a
short period of random events should match the longer term distribu-
tion of results, so that a player who has lost several times in a row will
believe that those losses increase his chances of winning in the near
future.272 Pathological gamblers may also underestimate their losses
by systematically recalling more wins than losses. 273 One reason for
overestimating wins is the tendency to fixate on absolute frequency,
rather than focusing on the ratio of wins to losses. Problem gamblers
may think only about how often they have won, ignoring the fact that
Breen et al., Cognitive Changes in Pathological Gamblers Following a 28-Day Inpatient Program, 15
PSYCHOL. ADDIcTIvE BEHAV. 246, 246 (2001) (noting that environmental and social factors
are equally important in contributing to the acceptability and meaning of gambling to the
gambler).
266. Anthony D. Miyazaki et al., Promoting and Countering Consumer Misconceptions of Ran-
dom Events: The Case of Perceived Control and State-Sponsored Lotteries, 20J. PUB. PoL'Y & MAR-
KETING 254, 255 (2001). However, for a critique of the research into the illusion of control,
see Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 4-5. Delfabbro concludes that there is a problem in pre-
dicting when the illusion of control will occur, as it seems to depend on the context of the
gambling. Id.
267. Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 2.
268. Anne Caron & Robert Ladouceur, Erroneous Verbalizations and Risk Taking at Video
Lotteries, 94 BRT. J. PSYCHOL. 189, 189 (2003).
269. Miyazaki et al., supra note 266, at 255.
270. Tony Toneatto et al., Brief Report: Cognitive Distortions in Heavy Gambling, 13 J. GAM-
BLING STUD. 253, 265 (1997); see also Caron & Ladouceur, supra note 268, at 189.
271. Id. at 192.
272. Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 2.
273. Alex Blaszczynski & Derrick Silove, Cognitive and Behavioral Therapies for Pathological
Gambling, 11 J. GAMBLING STUD. 195, 204 (1995). Delfabbro states that the "availability
heuristic refers to the tendency for more salient events (e.g. wins) being more easily
remembered than less salient events (i.e. losses)." Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 2.
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they lost more than they won.2 7 4 Even more dangerous, perhaps, is a
gambler's belief that, if she has lost money, she should keep gambling
because she is likely to win her losses back, a phenomenon known as
"chasing.' ' 275
These theories of the imperfect heuristics employed by gamblers
are buttressed by generalized theories of flawed decision-making.276
People have "limited computational skills and seriously flawed memo-
ries." 277 They "tend to classify small probability events rather crudely
as either possible or impossible."278 In this way, people may act as if it
is possible to win the lottery if they buy a ticket, while treating much
more likely occurrences, such as being struck by lightning, as so im-
probable as to be ignored.279 Other heuristics relied on to make deci-
sions based on risk and uncertainty include the tendency of people to
be excessively optimistic about their chances of avoiding an adverse
outcome. 28 0 People are also affected unduly by how information is
framed; they will state very different preferences based on apparently
minor changes in how a potential choice is described, seeming to pre-
fer options expressed in terms of gains over those expressed in terms
of losses, even where the identical information is conveyed in two sep-
arate ways.
281
274. Mark D. Griffiths, The Role of Cognitive Bias and Skill in Fruit Machine Gambling, 85
BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 351, 354 (1994).
275. John O'Connor & Mark Dickerson, Definition and Measurement of Chasing in Off-
Course Betting and Gaming Machine Play, 19 J. GAMBLING STUD. 359, 360 (2004). O'Connor
and Dickerson distinguish between chasing in a single session, in which many regular gam-
blers may engage, and chasing on a long term basis between sessions, which is more likely a
feature of compulsive gambling. Id. at 360.
276. See Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1141, 1142 n.4 (2001). "Heuristics" are
the "supposed rules of thumb" people use to make decisions while "biases" are the errors
made by using such rules of thumb, if such errors are made systematically among a study
population. Id.
277. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. Rv.
1471, 1477 (1998).
278. Philip J. Cook & Charles T. Clotfelter, The Peculiar Scale Economies of Lotto, 83 Am.
ECON. REV. 634, 638 (1993) (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and
Frames, 39 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 345 (1984)).
279. WALSH, supra note 104, at 341 (noting that the odds of being struck by lightning are
greater than winning "even the easiest lottery").
280. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Prob-
lem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 656 (1999). Calling this the "Optimistic
bias," Hanson and Kysar state, "[o]ne particular manifestation of this bias is the tendency
of people to underestimate their own chance of suffering some adverse outcome even
when they accurately state or even overstate everyone else's chance of suffering that same
outcome." Id.
281. See id. at 644-45.
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Providing players with accurate information about the true cost
of their gambling should help counterbalance these imperfect heuris-
tics. 28 2 Although some studies of cognitive treatment of gambling
have been criticized for having too few subjects and not comparing
this treatment to other possible treatments, some critics suggest this
approach may be useful.283
Several studies have indicated that providing better information
to gamblers may help them overcome these defective strategies and
gain more effective control over their gambling. A study of lottery
play showed that, for those who engage in excessive lottery play be-
cause of the misperception that they can control the outcome of their
wager, information provided in warning labels can reduce "control-
related behaviors" and reduce the purchase of lottery tickets.28 4 In
another study involving roulette, correct information caused more ef-
fective gambling and earlier cessation. 285 A study of punters-those
who bet on the horses-concluded that there was a significant nega-
tive correlation between the ability to process information and the
likelihood of problem gambling. 286 The author of the study con-
cluded that the education of such gamblers should be a priority and
that they "must be educated with respect to appropriate betting behav-
ior, and also with respect to sensible [information] processing meth-
ods."' 28 7 Recent research regarding whether pathological gambling
could be helped by cognitive treatment to "target gamblers' errone-
ous perceptions of randomness" concluded that its results "suggest
that a cognitive treatment can significantly improve pathological gam-
bling.''28 s Although "changing attitudes towards gambling may be a
process that takes more than a single information session" research
282. Ferland et al., supra note 263, at 20 (citing A. Gaboury & R. Ladouceur, Evaluation
of a Prevention Program for Pathological Gambling Among Adolescents, J. OF PRIMARY PREVENTION
14, 21-28 (1993)).
283. See, e.g., Petry & Armentano, supra note 262, at 1021.
284. Miyazaki et al., supra note 266, at 256. The study showed that the warnings were
less effective for those people who purchased tickets based on the belief that they were
"lucky," however. Id.
285. Mark R. Dixon et al., Examining the Roles of Rule Following, Reinforcement, and Preexper-
imental Histories on Risk-taking Behavior, PSYCHOL. REC., Oct. 1, 2002.
286. Mark Solonsch, An Analysis of Skill in Gambling, in GAMBLING AND COMMERCIAL GAM-
ING: ESSAYS IN BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 477.
287. Id.
288. Robert Ladouceur et al., Cognitive Treatment of Pathological Gambling, 189J. NERVOUS
& MENTAL DISEASE 774, 775, 780 (2001). This study focused on "correction of erroneously
perceived links between random events in gambling situations." Id. at 775. For a similar
study also showing the effectiveness of cognitive and behavioral treatment, see Caroline
Sylvain et al., Cognitive and Behaviour Treatment of Pathological Gambling: A Controlled Study, 65
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 727, 727 (1997).
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indicates that "an increase in realistic knowledge about gambling can
be followed by positive changes in gambling behavior. "289
To be most effective, any informational remedy designed to aid
problem gamblers should likely provide the information to gamblers
while they are gambling. 9 It appears that there is a cognitive shift
during the gambling process. After researching the beliefs of gam-
blers during play and outside of play, one researcher concluded that
even individuals who recognized the random aspect of gambling
outside of play revealed erroneous beliefs about their ability to control
or predict the game's result. He found "that two distinctive cognitive
sets about gambling can be present in the gambler's mind, one ra-
tional outside the game session and an irrational one triggered by the
characteristics of the game."29' Slot machine players who otherwise
acknowledge that they have no actual control over the outcome of
their wager may over-gamble because of an illusion of control over the
machine, despite the irrationality of this belief and the fact that such
players know that they generally lose more than they win and expect
to lose on whatever machine on which they play next.2 9 2 A study of
the verbalizations of slot machine players and other gamblers indi-
cates that even though "subjects correctly perceived the game as being
based on luck or chance before and after play," during play, many
game related verbalizations indicated erroneous perceptions.2 93 A
separate study indicated that regular gamblers uttered more irrational
verbalizations than non-regular gamblers.294 More recently, a study
289. Ferland et al., supra note 263, at 19, 21.
290. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 274, at 354 (noting that "cognitive factors may be
crucial in understanding persistent gambling").
291. Robert Ladouceur, Perceptions Among Pathological and Nonpathological Gamblers, AD-
DICTIVE BEHAVS., Oct. 14, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com.
292. Michael B. Walker, The Presence of Irrational Thinking Among Poker Machine Players, in
GAMBLING AND COMMERCIAL GAMING: ESSAYS IN BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, PHILOSOPHY AND SCI-
ENCE, supra note 107, at 489-90. Walker cautions that his study is based on a small sample.
Id. at 496.
293. Anne Gaboury & Robert Ladouceur, Erroneous Perceptions and Gambling, 4 J. Soc.
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 411, 414 (1989). This study excluded non-game related verbaliza-
tions. Griffiths, supra note 274, at 364. Griffiths' study of slot machine play included non-
game related verbalizations and, corrected for that difference, reached similar results. Id.;
see also Delfabbro & Winefield, supra note 253, at 125 (finding results generally consistent
with the Gaboury and Ladouceur study).
294. Griffiths, supra note 274, at 363. Delfabbro and Winefield note, however, that it is
not clear how these irrational beliefs develop and what their exact relationship to behavior
is. Paul H. Delfabbro & Anthony H. Winefield, Poker-machine Gambling: An Analysis of
Within Session Characteristics, 90 BRIT.J. PSYCHOL. 425, 437 (1999). Delfabbro also notes that
regular gamblers may express different types of irrational beliefs because they have had
more time while playing gambling machines to develop new "associations, strategies, and
more colourful ways of describing them." Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 6.
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found that, although pathological gamblers do not "report signifi-
cantly more erroneous perceptions than nonpathological gamblers,"
pathological gamblers have significantly more conviction in those er-
roneous beliefs.295 Professor Ladouceur theorized from the results of
the study that, although nonproblem gamblers seemed to learn to
criticize their erroneous perceptions from their losses, pathological
gamblers appeared to increase their conviction in their beliefs.296
A study published in 2002 of video lottery terminals, specifically
Canadian electronic gaming machines that can be configured either
to feature spinning reels or video poker, suggests that informational
remedies applied during gambling, as well as other ways of manipulat-
ing the machine gambling experience, can help reduce machine gam-
bling by pathological gamblers.297  In that study, the researchers
discovered that a simple informational remedy, having a single
counter displaying a running total of how much the gambler had ei-
ther won or lost, made it significantly easier for a pathological gam-
bler to end a play session. 298 By comparison, the counter did not
significantly affect the play of non-pathological gamblers. 299 Because
it was a laboratory study with a relatively small sample, it is not certain
whether the results of this study will accurately predict the general
behavior of gamblers in casinos, however. 00
Clearly, research into the cognitive causes and treatments for
problem and pathological gambling is still in its initial stages, and sig-
nificant research remains to be done.30 ' For example, studies con-
ducted in laboratory conditions should be replicated in more real
302
world settings. Also, many studies of pathological or problem gain-
blers have, as their subjects, those who have presented themselves for
295. Ladouceur, supra note 291, at 9.
296. Id.
297. Pamela Loba et al., Manipulations of the Features of Standard Video Lottery Terminal
(VLT) Games: Effects in Pathological and Non-Pathological Gamblers, 17J. GAMBLING STUD. 297,
319 (2002).
298. Id. at 314.
299. Id.
300. ALEX BLAszczVNsKI ET AL., THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE RECONFIGURATION
ON ELECTRONIC GAMING MACHINES AS HARM MINIMISATION STRATEGIES FOR PROBLEM GAM-
BLING 36 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).
The Blaszczynski report also criticized the Loba study, then in unpublished form, by argu-
ing that "variables were manipulated in combination making it impossible to determine
which made the primary contribution[ ]" and the study participants "were instructed to
play for set periods and it is not clear whether they played with their own money or money
provided by the researchers." Id. at 39.




treatment, which may not be a representative group. 3  In fact, ethi-
cal considerations may restrict the type of studies that may be used on
problem gamblers, for fear that the study may increase their gam-
bling. 4 If "Truth in Gaming" were solely for the benefit of problem
and pathological gamblers, more studies should be undertaken to en-
sure that price disclosures would help them. However, given that non-
problem, recreational gamblers would also benefit from the changes
that I suggest and that price disclosure is a basic part of consumer
protection, this proposal should not rise or fall solely on the results of
further study of problem and pathological gamblers.
If information about the true costs of gambling helps pathologi-
cal gamblers, that information should not be limited to treatment ses-
sions for problem gamblers.3 °5 Given the extremely limited funds that
states have dedicated to treating pathological gamblers, too few patho-
logical gamblers ever receive any organized treatment. 3 6 As of 1999,
"fewer than 150 clinicians are nationally certified gambling counsel-
ors, and only 100 programs provide treatment for pathological gam-
blers.., and individuals can remain on a waiting list for as long as six
months. '30 7 The treatment of problem gambling is often not covered
by insurance, which limits the funds available for treatment. 38 No
doubt for a multitude of reasons, both internal and external to them-
selves, most pathological gamblers do not seek treatment, let alone
receive any.30 9
States and the federal government should not wait passively until
too many become problem and pathological gamblers. Instead, they
should ensure that all gamblers have easy access to the information
that can help them control their gambling. Then, gamblers can bene-
fit from this information before their gambling beliefs and patterns
become fixed and harder to change. 10 Such informational disclosure
should be mandated so long as the distribution of such informiation is
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See id. at 41-42 (discussing various research strategies for minimizing the problem
of gambling).
306. See Petry & Armentano, supra note 262, at 1022 (indicating that there are few state
supported treatment programs).
307. Id.
308. Rychlak, supra note 4, at 340.
309. Petry & Armentano, supra note 262, at 1021.
310. Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 18.
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not too expensive and does not have other detrimental effects that
outweigh the benefits to be gained."' 1
VII. "TRUTH IN GAMING": DESIGNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE
INFORMATIONAL REMEDIES FOR GAMBLERS
Deciding that casinos should be required to disclose to gamblers
the true cost of slot machines leads directly to the question of how
casinos can effectively disclose the risk or costs of gambling to con-
sumers. Educational efforts, like advertising campaigns, can succeed
or fail. 12 The exact wording of a particular warning may be crucial to
consumers' ability to glean useful information from it.31 3 From the
literature on other hazard warning programs, the following lessons
can be discovered on how best to educate consumers.
The information should be presented as simply and as clearly as
possible, focusing on that which most affects the consumer.
The history of disclosures indicates that this simple rule is vio-
lated all too often. 14 Where too much information is presented to
consumers, they tend to ignore it, treating it as if no useable informa-
tion had been provided to them.3" 5
The information should be tailored as much as possible to the
individual consumer.
Consumers, unsurprisingly, are more likely to notice and heed
warnings that are individually tailored to them.316 For example, a
study of various educational campaigns concluded that the most effec-
311. See BLASZCZYSIU ET AL., supra note 300, at 15 (stating that policies on gambling
should address the issue of costs by implementing strategies that minimize interference to
those who gamble responsibly).
312. Id. at 43-44 (indicating that players may not care whether the cost is or is not
advertised).
313. "It turns out that human performance in probabilistic reasoning tasks is remarkably
sensitive to the format in which information is presented and answers asked for." Robert
E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. Rrv. 1603, 1642
n.89 (2000) (citing studies showing that participants' ability to answer probabilistic ques-
tions depended on whether those questions were framed in terms of probabilities or
frequencies).
314. For example, a study of hazard warnings used for pesticides showed that the de-
tailed information about the products' health risks confused consumers. W. Kip Viscusi,
Using Warnings to Extend the Boundaries of Consumer Sovereignty, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
211, 230 (1999).
315. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 653, 668.
316. Robert S. Alder & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an
Adequate Substitute for Regulation, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 188-89 (1983) (suggesting that
people learn more from informational remedies tailored to fit them).
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tive campaign was one in which the researchers were able to analyze
the behavior patterns of the individual participants and construct "in-
dividualized behavior modification techniques"-tailored programs to
fit the individual's own lifestyle and risks.3" 7 Such individually tailored
information was far more effective than the generalized information
given in the other informational campaigns studied.318
A common format for the information provided should be used
throughout the industry, if possible.
Standardizing the information provided to consumers allows con-
sumers to become acquainted with the format of the information and
to learn how to read and understand the information more easily and
quickly. Some gambling terms, such as hold percentage or payback
percentage, are conceptually difficult, and those who write about gam-
bling find that consumers and even many casino professionals often
do not understand them. 19 The fewer terms consumers need to
learn and the more standardized the usage is, the more easily consum-
ers can educate themselves about the specific information pro-
vided.32° Furthermore, by standardizing information disclosures
across the gaming industry, consumers will be better able to compare
prices among different games in the same casino, among casinos, and
even among different geographical areas. 21 Standardization of infor-
mation disclosure also makes gathering and disseminating the infor-
mation less expensive for the casinos and easier for gaming
commissions to monitor.
3 22
The information should be provided in such a way that its meaning or
import cannot easily be misrepresented or explained away by a seller of a
good or service.
If gambling consumers are provided information about gambling
prices, it should be stated to them in a common sense manner, so that
it would be difficult for unscrupulous casino operators to undercut
the usefulness of the message by misrepresenting its meaning. The
317. Id. at 186.
318. Id. at 188.
319. HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at vii (indicating that "[m]any casino profession-
als limit their advancements by failing to understand the mathematics of the games and
their relationships to casino profitability").
320. See Alder & Pittle, supra note 316, at 188.
321. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American





best way to accomplish this would be to not rely on some artificially
constructed indicator of price or return.3 21 Instead, the provided in-
formation should use words that most consumers will already under-
stand.3 24 The hazard of creating a standardized price indicator that is
not already commonly known is demonstrated in the Truth in Lend-
ing context, where consumers are informed of the cost of loans
through a figure called the Annual Percentage Rate (APR). 25 Con-
sumers are often misled as to the meaning of the APR; they are told
that it is merely a number that the government orders the lender to
provide or that it indicates something other than its true meaning.3 26
Gamblers may have difficulty understanding such terms as
payback percentage, but, almost universally, they understand winning
and losing. If the information regarding price of games is expressed
in terms of average amount lost rather than a payback percentage,
gambling consumers would better understand the information pro-
vided.327 However, casinos would likely fight having to use the word
"loss" in any form in price disclosures.
Informational Remedies Should Avoid, to the Extent Possible,
Presenting the Information in Terms of Probabilities.
Consumers evidently have a more difficult time effectively
processing information presented to them in probabilistic form.3 28
Worse yet is consumers' inability to compare one probability against
another to see which risk is better for them.3 29 Because probabilistic
information is at the heart of gambling, this inability to understand
that form of information affects gamblers more than other consum-
323. See id. (discussing the benefits of standardization in the health care context).
324. See id.
325. Re-Examining Truth In Lending: Do Borrowers Actually Use Consumer Disclosures?, 52
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 3, 4-7 (1998).
326. Id. at 6.
327. See ABT ET AL., supra note 109, at 263-64.
328. Cass Sunstein points out that some consumers may not welcome the disclosure of
probabilistic information. See Sunstein, supra note 192, at 653, 668 ("There is also evidence
that people feel frustrated and frightened by probabilistic information and greatly prefer a
certain answer."). Such fear and frustration is likely more commonly experienced, how-
ever, where probabilistic information concerns dangers to health or safety than when it
concerns the odds of winning a prize. Less fear of such probabilistic information in gam-
ing situations does not necessarily indicate a greater understanding of it, however.
329. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer
Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 81, 112
(2000) ("[M]any consumers haven't the foggiest idea of how to work with independent
and especially joint probabilities."); see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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ers.33° Gamblers, for example, have great difficulty in judging the cost
of gambling and its expected value to them if they are given their
chances of winning in the form of odds.331
A. Specic Types of Informational Remedies in Casino Gambling
1. General Warnings of the Costs of Gambling.-One possible style
of warnings could mimic those that currently are required on alco-
hol3 2 and tobacco products. 33 In fact, similar warning labels for
gambling have occasionally appeared.334 For example, in New South
Wales, Australia, new gaming regulations enacted in 2000 required
any registered club to display in its poker machine areas a notice
describing the chances of winning the major prize on a particular
gaming machine, in the following form:
The chance of winning a maximum prize up to $10,000 on a
gaming machine is generally no better than 1 in
1,000,000.3 35
330. See Cabot & Hannum, supra note 125, at 333 ("Probability is at the foundation of
the gaming business. Every wager in a casino is designed and calibrated according to the
laws of chance to exact a certain percentage of the players' money.").
331. See, e.g., ABT ET AL., supra note 109, at 263. "Odds and price are frequently con-
fused by gamblers and even by the operators of commercial gambling businesses." Id.
332. The Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2000). This act
requires the following warning to be placed on alcoholic beverages: "GOVERNMENT
WARNING: (1) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic
beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alco-
holic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause
health problems." Id. This warning is a significantly "watered-down" version of the five
rotating warnings that had been originally proposed. Carter H. Dukes, Comment, Alcohol
Manufacturers and the Duty to Warn: An Analysis of Recent Case Law in Light of the Alcoholic
Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 38 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1208-09 (1989).
333. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
334. See DEP'T OF GAMING AND RACING, NEW SOUTH WALES Gov'T, REGISTERED CLUBS
AMENDMENT (RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING) REGULATION 2000, at 1 (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.dgr.nsw.gov.au/IMAGES/PUBLICATIONS/Liquor&Gaming/LegislationBull
etins/ClubsLegApril_00.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004) (discussing regulations that re-
quire gaming clubs to post gambling warnings).
335. Id. at 2. The New South Wales regulations required registered gaming clubs to post
both a gambling warning notice and a problem gambling notice:
DON'T LET GAMBLING TAKE CONTROL OF YOUR LIFE
GAMBLING CAN BECOME ADDICTIVE
EXCESSIVE GAMBLING CAN RUIN LIVES
EXCESSIVE GAMBLING CAN DESTROY FAMILIES AND FRIENDSHIPS
EXCESSIVE GAMBLING CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF YOUR HOME OR
OTHER ASSETS
EXCESSIVE GAMBLING CAN AFFECT YOUR HEALTH
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Although such disclosure is a step in the right direction, it is
flawed in that it presents the information in terms of probabilities,
which consumers have difficulty understanding, and it does not let the
gambler know how much on average she can expect to lose in any
effort to win the maximum prize.
2. Tailoring the Informational Remedy to the Specific Game or Ma-
chine.-A more effective informational remedy would be one which
requires casinos to provide on each machine the true cost of gaming
on that machine. Such a remedy would allow an individual patron to
decide if the gamble is worth the price." 6 In addition, the remedy
may coerce casinos to compete on the basis of price, which would
likely drive down the hold percentages of slot machines." 7 The cost
of slot machines should be disclosed in terms of their hold percent-
ages and not their payback percentages, because the former focuses
on what both the customer and the casino really care about-how
much the slot machines really cost. 3 3 8 Also, the payback percentage is
inherently confusing, as it is akin to asking someone returning from a
trip to Las Vegas, "How much money didn't you lose?" 33 9 Using the
hold percentage also better displays the real variation between differ-
ent slot machines. 4 ° For example, at first glance, there seems to be
little difference between a payback percentage of 96% and of 98%.
However, expressed in hold percentages, it is easy to see that a 4%
machine is twice as expensive as a 2% machine. 41
336. See supra Part V (discussing NewJersey casinos' unwillingness to advertise their slot
machine payback percentages out of fear that a price war would develop).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN PRonucrTpvr COMM'N, AUSTRALIA'S GAMBLING INDUSTRIES: IN-
QUIRY REPORT, REPORT No. 10, at 16.14 (Nov. 26, 1999), available at http://www.pc.gov.au/
inquiry/gambling (last visited Jan. 8, 2004) (providing an example of the difficulty con-
sumers have in understanding the payback rate) [hereinafter INQUIRY REPORT]. In Austra-
lia, the Australian Gaming Machine Manufacturers Association (AGMMA), hardly an
unbiased organization, questioned whether disclosing price would have any affect, stating:
When gaming machines were first introduced into the ACT, it was required that
the player return be advertised on the front of the machines. For the first six
months there was a landslide of complaints from individual players that they
didn't get the advertised rate. Within twelve months the complaints had virtually
ceased-presumably because the players stopped believing or stopped caring. In
any event, it made no difference to the play rates-they mirrored results obtained
on identical NSW machines with no such signage.
Id. The Productivity Commission goes on to note that the AGMMA "considered that the
use of average payout rates was highly likely to confuse players or create false expectations,
because of the way gaming machines work." Id.
340. See generally id. at 16.14-16.22 (discussing options for price disclosure).
341. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (detailing the method used to cal-
culate the hold percentage).
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Given the difficulty many consumers have with probabilistic infor-
mation, the average loss should be expressed to customers not only as
a percentage rate, requiring at times complex mental math, but also
as an exact sum.342 It would likely be easier for a gambler to under-
stand an average hold amount of three cents for each quarter bet than
for them to understand a 12% hold percentage.
Providing the average loss in terms of the amount of money
rather than a percentage rate would have one great advantage. For
traditional slot machines, the hold percentage of slot machines de-
creases as the denomination accepted by the slot machine in-
creases.343 If a consumer were only given the hold percentage, the
dollar slots may seem like the least expensive betting option.344 This
apparent bargain would be an illusion if the consumer were most con-
cerned about losing as little money as possible or playing for as long as
possible on a given sum of money.345 Using the hold amount instead
of hold percentage has another advantage. If customers are told only
that they will lose on average 6% of the amount bet on a certain ma-
chine, and they arrive with $100 to bet, they might erroneously con-
clude that they are likely to lose only $6. Their error would stem from
the fact that most gamblers regamble their winnings, and many con-
tinue to play slot machines until they have lost all of the money they
brought with which to play.34 6 By comparison, if a gambler is in-
342. See supra notes 328-331 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties many
consumers have in understanding and using probabilistic information).
343. See, e.g., Press Release, Nevada Gaming Control Bd., Nevada Gaming Revenues, Cal-
endar Year 2003 Analysis (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://gaming.nv.gov (last visited
Mar. 6, 2004) (indicating that during the year 2003, the hold percentage for slot machines
in Nevada was 8.17% for penny slot machines, 7.89% for nickel slot machines, 5.51% for
quarter slot machines, 4.67% for dollar slot machines, and 3.39% for twenty-five dollar slot
machines). This analysis uses the term "hold percentage" which is equivalent to the defini-
tion of hold percentage used in this article. Id.; see also supra note 106 (defining hold
percentage). By comparison, during its fiscal year 2000, the average comparable hold per-
centages for slot machines in South Dakota were 8.42% for nickel slots, 9.51% for quarter
slots, and 8.38% for dollar slots, or nearly twice as expensive as Nevada slot machines for
the quarter and dollar games. SOUTH DAKOTA COMMISSION ON GAMING, ANNUAL REPORT
FIscAL YEAR 2000 & GAMING ABSTRACT 10, at http://www.state.sd.us/dcr/gaming/annual_
report/gamannrpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). The South Dakota report notes that it is
not audited and may be inaccurate, as it adds slot machine and other electronic games
together. Id.
344. See Nev. Gaming Control Bd., supra note 343 (indicating that the hold percentages
for higher denomination slots are less).
345. For example, a dollar machine with a hold percentage of 4.4% costs, on average,
4.4 cents a play. Id. By comparison, a quarter machine with a hold percentage of 5.4%
costs only 1.35 cents per quarter bet, or about 3 cents per play less than the dollar ma-
chine. Id.
346. Delfabbro, supra note 259, at 8.
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formed that he will lose ten cents each time he plays a dollar slot if it
has a 10% hold percentage, he can determine, on average, how long
his stake will hold out.
The fact that slot machines can use many different types of coins
affects how disclosures should be made. One of the newest trends is
the use of slot machines that allow a player to bet numerous coins at
once, effectively allowing a gambler on a nickel slot machine to bet
any amount between five cents and multiple dollars. 4 7 Disclosing this
cost per nickel would be too confusing.
Ideally, the slot machine's disclosure of its average loss should be
interactive, so that as a gambler wagers more coins or money, he can
see how much his hold percentage changes and his average expected
loss increases. Slot machines should be designed in such a way that
their face should have one display that tracks how the hold percent-
age changes with the changing gambling patterns of the individual
player. This way, a player could learn whether betting the maximum
number of quarters decreases the hold percentage from, say 5.5% to
4.9%. A gambler could also learn whether and when a slot machine
with a progressive jackpot or one that allows players to work toward
greater jackpots is a better bet than other available machines. An-
other display would track the hold amount given the amount wagered
by the gambler. This would let the gambler discover how much, on
average, she can expect to lose if she bets 25 nickels at a time, as op-
posed to 20 nickels or 10. With each new amount she wagers, the
hold amount would almost certainly change, while the hold percent-
age may change or not.
This interactivity would have several advantages. First of all, it
would quickly educate many gamblers about hold percentages and
hold amounts, as well as how their style of play affects the amount of
likely losses. If gamblers see the hold percentage for each machine
and can see how their wagering affects that hold percentage, they
could learn the true extent of their ability to alter the hold percentage
of the slot machine and, therefore, might be less convinced that they
can otherwise control the machine.3 4 This knowledge could dimin-
ish the illusion of control over machines that affects some problem
347. Grochowski, supra note 137, at 29. Thus, nickel slots may allow the wagering of a
greater sum than quarter slots, which may allow a maximum bet of only $1.25. Associated
Press, Nevada Casinos Find Gains in Nickel Slots Are No Small Change, SAN DIEGO UNION &
TRIB., Dec. 29, 2001, at A10.
348. See Walker, supra note 292, at 489-90 (noting that a few video poker players irration-




gamblers.149 Secondly, many gamblers would likely enjoy this new in-
teractive aspect to slot machines, as it would challenge them to find
machines and gambling strategies that provided the greatest re-
turn.35° Rather than being a burdensome regulation, this interactive
information may prove to be an added pleasure for slot machine play-
ers, adding an interesting level of skill.351 Gamblers who do not want
to have this interactive nature could always ignore the numbers dis-
played on the slot machine.
3. Tailoring the Informational Remedy to the Specific Gambler.-An
important tool to help gamblers limit excessive gambling would be to
give them a simple and accurate method of tracking their winnings
and losses so that they can monitor how much gambling costs them
personally. As noted in Part VI, gamblers and especially problem
gamblers appear to over-estimate the amount they win and under-esti-
mate their losses on a systematic basis." 2 An Australian commission
on gambling noted that " [t] racking expenditure by gamblers is much
more difficult than other forms of entertainment because of the vola-
tile patterns of wins and losses, the fact that wins are more easily recal-
led than losses, other problems of biased evaluation by gamblers...
[] and the lack of records in many cases. 353
One simple way of tracking winnings and losses would be equip-
ping slot machines with a counter that records how much the gambler
is ahead or behind in that particular session.354 Machines could be
designed so that the use of the counter is optional, and gamblers
could turn off the counter if they so desired, in order to outflank the
casinos' argument that gamblers would be annoyed by the counters
and would not want them installed. The default mode of the slot ma-
chines should be to have the counters on, so that gamblers would
need to choose affirmatively to turn them off, thereby maximizing
349. Id.
350. See id. at 486 (noting that "[p]oker machine players report playing for amusement
and excitement").
351. Id.
352. See supra notes 273-274 and accompanying text; see also GERSTEIN ET AL., supra note
39, at 33 (reporting that based on the self-reports of gamblers, "[t]he balance of past-year
casino wins and losses for last-day and past-year items shows patrons ending up with a $5
billion or $3 billion windfall, instead of leaving more than $20 billion at tables and ma-
chines-the revenues reported by the casino industry").
353. AUSTRALIAN PRODucTrlWTY COMM'N, supra note 339, at 16.26.
354. See Loba et al., supra note 297, at 298-317 (detailing a study indicating that even this




their use and ensuring that gamblers know about the counters.355
This single-session information is limited, though, because it would
not give gamblers a broader view of their overall gains and losses from
gambling, and gamblers might ascribe any losses to simply sitting at a
"cold" machine.
With the advent of computerized slot machines and casino
databases, it would be easy for many casinos to give individual gam-
blers highly detailed information regarding their overall gains and
losses. Casinos have already begun to keep extensive information
about their customers through the use of what are called "slots
clubs. '3 56 Slot clubs are the method by which casinos track the gam-
bling of individual slots betters and determine how much they play,
win, and lose. 357 To track the play of table games, casinos have long
had a system of employees filling out sheets noting the amount bet by
table players, allowing the casino to discover who its high-rolling cus-
tomers are and provide these valuable players with complimentary ser-
vices, such as meals, hotel rooms, or transportation, that correspond
to the player's level of betting.3 58 Those who bet and risked more
received better complimentary services, known as "comps," to induce
them to return to the casino.35 9
For slots players, such a systematic tracking of the individual
player's betting was for a long time difficult. 6 ° Slots players do not
conduct their gambling under the watchful eye of a dealer, 61 and
additionally, watching slots players would not only be expensive, given
355. For example, if a counter on a slot machine has been turned off, the slot machine
could automatically turn the counter back on after the machine has sat idle for five min-
utes, indicating that the gambler has stopped playing on the machine. See id
356. Barfield, supra note 5. The first use of slot clubs was possibly in 1982 at the Golden
Nugget in Atlantic City. Id.
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., NICK GULLO & DAVE VERBON, CASINO MARKETING: A PROFESSIONAL AP-
PROACH 115 (1982) (discussing the handwritten rating card for individual players used in
the pre-computer age).
359. FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 137. "Comping," the practice of providing free goods
or services to customers, began in Las Vegas with free cocktails in the early 1940s, with
meals added as comps in the late 1940s, and by the end of the 1950s, free hotel rooms. Id.
One guide to gambling estimates that casinos are willing to return about 40% of a player's
losses to that player in the form of comps. Steve Bourie, Casino Comps-Part I, in AMERICAN
CASINO GUIDE, supra note 1, at 16.
360. See Barfield, supra note 5 (indicating that modern slot-player tracking systems
evolved in the early 1980s in Atlantic City).
361. Traditionally, pit bosses kept notes on gamblers. Id. "Player tracking has always
existed in some form. It used to be notes in a pit boss' pocket to help schmooze a high
roller: his favorite drink, his wife's name." Id.
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the numerous slot machines and gamblers, but also might antagonize
the players who value their relative privacy.362
Slot clubs, on the other hand, track players with less expense and
intrusiveness and with more accuracy.3 163 Upon joining a slot club, a
player is issued a plastic card which looks much like a credit card with
a magnetic strip on the back.364 Slot machines have readers that are
able to decode the information about the player contained on the
magnetic strip. 65 As soon as the player slides the slot club card into
the slot machine's reader, the slot machine is able to record how
much that particular player bet and the player's wins or losses.366
Casinos use this information to award comps and also to spur
greater play.367 If a slot player is betting heavily, the slot machine's
monitoring system will detect that use, and the casino can send a floor
person to offer the player a beverage and establish rapport.368 Some
slot machine systems have countdown systems, which notify players
that they must play a certain number of coins to receive a point good
toward the redemption of "comps," and thus encourage players to stay
at the slot machine until they have received enough points. 369 Other
systems allow the slot machine to display a player's total points good
toward "comps," saving the player a trip to the slot club booth to in-
quire how many points she has accumulated.3 70 The comp system is
so important to casinos that on average they spend more of their ad-
362. By comparison, using computer analysis of information flowing from its slot ma-
chines, a casino can track 2000 machines virtually instantaneously. Id. One casino's infor-
mation systems director can "tap his laptop computer and get a floor map of [the casino's]
2,000 slot machines. The dots change colors in response to dozens of queries he can make
about who plays what." Id.
363. NESTOR, supra note 119, at 266. Nestor notes that casinos created slot clubs origi-
nally for slots but are now integrating them to track table games as well. Id.
364. John Grochowski, Players Bet On Comps to Stretch Bankrolls, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 4,
2001, at 7.
365. Barfield, supra note 5.
366. See Critic- Casinos Target Addicts: Slot Clubs Allegedly Used to Identify Problem Gamblers,
PEORIAJ. STAR, Apr. 20, 1998, at Al (arguing that casinos use their ability to track gamblers
to identify problem gamblers and encourage them to gamble further) [hereinafter Critic).
367. "A casino may, for example, comp rooms, meals, or drinks depending on how
much an individual is spending in the casino." SHELLY FIELD, 100 BEST CAREERS IN CASINOS
AND CASINO HOTELS 19 (1997). The number and generosity of the comps "generally de-
pend on the amount an individual is spending in the casino. The host may track the
amount being spent by customers in order to know what type of comps should be author-
ized." Id. at 23.
368. Erika Gosker, Note, The Marketing of Gambling to the Elderly, 7 ELDER L.J. 185, 192
(1999).




justed gross revenue on comps (21%) than they do on employee pay-
roll (18%). vl
Casinos use the information they glean not only to award comps,
but also to target their marketing and promotion efforts. For exam-
ple, they may send mailers to individual gamblers who are more likely
to come in for a Tuesday or Wednesday promotion. 72 By purchasing
information from other sources, they can discover if customers are
also playing at other casinos.3 73 The information casinos gather is so
specific that they could "literally go through there and do a slice and
dice of [their] database and get every 20-year-old unmarried female
who spends more than $20 a week and drives a Toyota," according to
an executive for a firm that develops such player-tracking systems.
3 74
Casinos are now in the process of developing even more powerful
tracking systems, able to log over a million slot club card transactions
per month and store all of that information for years, with the ability
to retrieve it whenever needed.375 At least one casino chain's pro-
gram links all of its casinos around the country, so that a gambler's
play in any casino in the chain counts toward complimentary
376services.
The information casinos collect on individual gamblers could be
used to notify players of the costs of playing slots. That notification
could be personalized in a way that would make it more effective than
merely giving a player information about the average hold percentage
of an individual machine or even the average hourly cost of playing
that machine.3 77 Instead, the slot club could be used to allow each
371. GARRETT, supra note 15, at 7.
372. Barfield, supra note 5.
373. Christina Binkley, Gambling: Harrah's Builds Database About Patrons, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 2, 1997, at BI.
374. Barfield, supra note 5.
375. See id. (stating that the current system in place at the Barona Indian Reservation
Casino logs 1.2 million transactions per month, can store the data for years, and retrieve
data at will).
376. John Grochowski, Vegas Faces Competition from California Casinos, CHI. SuN-TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2001, at 21 (noting that Harrah's Total Rewards program offers participants comps
and gifts at any Harrah's casino).
377. A few Australian states have begun experimenting with informational remedies,
such as requiring casinos to provide activity statements giving players summaries of their
winnings, losses, and time spent gambling. See, e.g., DEP'T OF GAMING AND RACING, NEW
SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA, GAMING MACHINES AMENDMENT 2002, available at http://www.
dgr.nsw.gov.au/HTML/LEGISLATION/amended/gaming-machines-reg.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2004). At least one Australian state requires a "player information display" on
gaming machines, which lists payback percentages and other information. AUSTRALASIAN
GAMING MACHINE MFRS. ASS'N, REVIEW OF GAMBLING HARM MINIMISATION MEASURES BY THE




player to find out how much that particular player has won or lost
over a set period of time, be it a day, a week, a month, a year, or
longer. In this way, a consumer could easily gain overall pricing infor-
mation about her own gambling habits that is otherwise fairly difficult
for her to track. 78
Requiring casinos to disclose this information is appropriate for
several reasons. First, those who gamble are the ones most likely to be
affected by casinos' use of tracking systems, as casinos use their
databases to focus on luring the most regular gamblers. 79 Because
casinos can use slot clubs to promote gambling especially among fre-
quent gamblers, it seems appropriate to use this same information to
decrease gambling by problem gamblers. In addition, as gamblers
come to rely on the comps provided by casinos in making their deter-
mination about how often and where to gamble, gamblers should be
able to ensure the reliability of the casinos' tracking methods by view-
ing as much of the casinos' information as possible. 80
Forcing casinos to disclose individual gambling records to those
gamblers who desire them will help gamblers understand how they
consume gambling as a product, which will, in turn, make them better
consumers of gambling.381 In an ideal world, individual consumers
could contract with casinos, allowing casinos to collect data regarding
the consumer's gambling habits if, in return, the casino would share
ited Apr. 4, 2004). However, these informational disclosures seem poorly designed, as the
cost of gambling is expressed in payback, not hold, percentages, and not in hold amount.
As a result, too much less-important information is included, such as hit percentage and
jackpot probabilities. Still, it is too early to deternine what effects these measures will have.
378. The difficulty of tracking casino gambling losses is aggravated by the fact that the
gambling is continuous, with a large number of small bets, making careful tracking more
arduous. See ABT ET AL., supra note 109, at 72 (stating that the continuous nature of gam-
bling prevents gamblers from reflecting on their losses). Furthermore, casinos attempt to
distract their customers from thinking about their losses. Id. Abt, Smith, and Christiansen
note:
Casinos utilize carefully calculated distractions-free drinks, flashing mirrored
lights, provocatively dressed women, and in areas of the casino floor devoted to
slot machines the jangle of coins and bells announcing jackpots. The result is
that it is easier to lose track of one's wins or losses inside a casino than at any
other commercial gambling game.
Id.
379. Critic, supra note 366.
380. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Informa-
tion Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1455 (2001) (referring to this process as "watching the
watchers," a system with reciprocal monitoring instead of the current unilateral monitor-
ing); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1463 (2000) (not-
ing that "protecting the acquisition and dissemination of information is an essential means
of empowering citizens in a democracy").
381. See supra notes 240-249 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of increased
information disclosure in gambling and its beneficial effects on gamblers as consumers).
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that information with the consumer.3 8 2  However, the transaction
costs of such individual contracting are high, as such a system would
force casinos to negotiate with each individual gambler. Thus, a de-
fault rule is appropriate.38 3 Furthermore, because casinos are more
knowledgeable than gamblers about the effects of slot clubs and
would likely incorporate waiver of the default rules in any form agree-
ment included in the slot club contract, a default rule requiring dis-
closure by the casinos should be non-waivable by the consumer.
38 4
This non-waivable default can be justified by both the difficulty of edu-
cating gamblers about the effects of waiving the rule and the twin
goals of protecting the individual gambler and also serving society's
interest in minimizing problem gambling.
3 85
This disclosure to gamblers of the information that casinos col-
lect could be done in several ways. First of all, casinos could be re-
quired to send, to each slot club member who requests one, an annual
accounting of how much the player won or lost during the year. Casi-
nos could also allow players to use the Internet to track their win and
loss amounts. At least one casino currently allows members of its slot
382. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1283,
1312 (2000) (quoting Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss).
383. For the importance of a default rule in data collection of consumers, see Lynn
Chuang Kramer, Private Eyes Are Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy Protection-Lessons
from Home and Abroad, 37 TEx. INT'L L.J. 387, 412 (2002) (stating that "[t]he default rule
would not be so important were it not for the fact that most people tend to use the default
rule-either out of ignorance, laziness, or indifference").
384. The unfairness of mere waivable defaults is discussed by Daniel Solove:
These laws [regarding consumer information] must consist of more than default
rules that can be contracted around or property entitlements that can be bar-
tered away. The market-based solutions work within the existing market; the
problem with databases is the very way that the market deals with personal infor-
mation-a problem in the nature of the market itself that prevents fair and volun-
tary information transactions.
Solove, supra note 380, at 1456.
385. Cass Sunstein notes:
Of course, many statutes create nonwaivable rights. They bypass the question of
default rules entirely by banning bargaining altogether. There are many reasons
why legislatures and courts might take this approach. Perhaps third-party effects
argue against waiver. Perhaps waivers would be inadequately informed; behavioral
economics offers a number of reasons why this might be so. Perhaps nonwaivable
rights can be justified, in the context of accommodation mandates, on redistribu-
tive grounds.
Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 108 (2002) (internal
footnotes omitted); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and
the Ownership of Human Capita4 34 CONN. L. REv. 765, 783 (2002) (discussing behavioral




club to access their club accounts through the casino's web page, so
that members can determine their level of reward credits. 386
More importantly, casinos could be required to have available in
each casino a number of machines that can read the slot player's card
and then give the player an immediate update of how much money
the player has won or lost in the last day, week, month, or year. If a
computer-operated card reader were plugged into the casino's data
bank, then a player would be able to find out the costs of his gambling
merely by swiping his card through the computer's reader. This ac-
cess to their gambling information would allow players to discover and
easily track their individual cost of playing the slot machines-infor-
mation directly tailored to them and their style of play.
An even more effective remedy would require each slot machine
to be equipped with a small screen that would, at the entry of a pass-
word, inform anyone playing it using a slot club card how much that
player was ahead or behind for the day, week, month, or year. The
slot machine and slot club card could even be designed to notify a
gambler when she had lost a pre-set amount, say fifty dollars in a day.
In this way, the player could obtain this information as he played, and
could be mindful of the overall cost of gambling to him as he decided
whether to continue to play. The casino could subtract from any
losses the cash rebates that they have provided to the player as part of
their slot club comps. 3 87 Of course, the machine could be set up so
that the display of this information would be voluntary, allowing a
player to choose not to learn how much he had won or lost. It should
also be password protected, so that a gambler could conceal his play
from anyone who might have access to his slot club card. Such imme-
diate access to a player's winnings or losses would most accurately dis-
close to players the information they would need to ensure that they
are engaging in an amount of gambling they desire, given its true
costs.
There is no doubt that there would be significant expense for
casinos to alter machines to include such a display. Such a program
should probably be mandated only for casinos with at least a mini-
mum number of slot machines.38 8 However, some casinos are already
386. See Harrah's Operating Co., at http://www.harrahs.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2004)
(allowing club members to access their slot club information by logging into Harrah's "To-
tal Rewards" web page).
387. See Jeffrey Compton, Slot Clubs, in AMERICAN CASINO GUIDE, supra note 1, at 24
(describing the comps available through slot clubs, including cash back based on the
amount the slot club member plays).




incurring such costs by operating the casino's slot club, tracking gam-
blers' wagers, and allowing members to monitor their slot club
points."8 9 Given that casinos already track millions of transactions and
retain this information indefinitely, and that they are able to set up
slot machines to notify gamblers how many comps they have earned,
requiring this kind of provision of information at the slot machine
does not seem to require informational processing and retention abil-
ities that many casinos do not already have.39 ° The live streaming
video system that some slot machines use is so technologically ad-
vanced it has forced at least one manufacturer to move from smaller
computer chips that drive the slot machines to "a new PC-based
processor called the AVP platform with hard-drive storage,"39' which
certainly seems powerful enough to process the information needed
to inform gamblers of the running total of their losses or winnings. In
addition, manufacturers have developed systems that permit "gaming
machines and slot-accounting systems [to] interconnect, and se-
cure[ ] data transfer between the gaming machine and an online
monitoring system ... [and] permit[ ] transferring player money and
promotional credits back and forth between the online monitoring
system and gaming machines." '92 This sophisticated technology, fi-
nanced from the losses of generations of gamblers, should be used for
informational remedies that could help pathological and problem
gamblers.
An even more versatile and useful system would incorporate
"smart card" technology to allow gamblers to track all of their gam-
bling winnings and losses regardless of the casino in which they are
gambling. Smart cards are similar to slot club cards, but they have an
imbedded computer chip in the card. This imbedded chip allows the
389. See Barfield, supra note 5 (noting that casinos notify gamblers of possible benefits to
entice them to visit the casinos); Watt, supra note 144; see also Harrah's Operating Co., Total
Rewards-Program Overview, at http://www.harrahs.com/e-totalrewards/overview.html (last
visited Jan. 8, 2004) (describing how a slot club member may check his losses and
winnings).
390. New Mexico's ability to monitor all non-tribal slot machines is an example of how
inexpensive it is to track slots. According to the 2000 annual report of the New Mexico
Gaming Control Board:
Located at each casino are the same style modems that receive/transmit data be-
tween the venue and Board [.] ... [L]icensed gaming machines in non-tribal
venues are under constant control by the CMS down to the component level [j
... [T]he Board is able to monitor and capture all electronic events occurring on
the gaming machines including cash in/out, door openings and substantial wins.
N.M. GAMING CONTROL BD., ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 10 (2000).
391. Higgins, supra note 133, at 75.
392. Id. According to a gaming industry executive, this new protocol will be imported
into "all casino systems as regulatory approvals are obtained." Id.
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card not only to store data, but also perform computational func-
tions.3 93 Smart cards and slot machines could be designed so that the
slot machine outputs the results of the gamblers' wagers to the smart
card. Then, a gambler could pull up all of his records by inserting the
smart card into a smart card reader and keying in his password or
personal identification number.
If casinos were required to equip slot machines with a smart card
reader-writer that conforms to national standards, a gambler could
take the same card to each casino she goes to, plug it into any slot
machine, and be able to track, compute, and compare not only her
winnings and losses, but also her net actual hold percentage among
all of the casinos she frequents.
Gamblers may have privacy concerns with such cards, and it
would be important to prevent casinos from gaining access to all of
the information stored on the smart card. Cards should feature data
encryption and password protection and also segregate data so that
casinos have access only to certain portions of the data on the card.394
Gamblers should not be required to use the smart cards in case they
desire even more privacy protection. However, most gamblers who
already use slot club cards and are familiar with automatic teller cards
would likely, easily, and happily adapt to this smart card technology.
B. Requiring Disclosure Would Increase Competitiveness
in the Gaming Industry
Besides helping both recreational and problem gamblers by giv-
ing them the information they need to decide how much to play, re-
quiring casinos to post the hold percentage of each slot machine and
allowing gamblers to track their cumulative hold percentages at each
casino will have the benefit of causing casinos to compete with each
other on the basis of their slot machine hold percentages. 95 Cur-
rently, there is some diffuse competition for slot players based on
payback rates, as players attempt to discover through experience or
what little information is publicly available which casinos have the best
393. Sara Kehaulanik Goo, An ID With a High IQ Smart Cards'Are In Demand as Concerns
About Security Rise, But Privacy Issues Loom, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2003, at H01.
394. For a discussion of the privacy concerns of smart cards and the possibility of using
data encryption as well as segregation of data to allay those concerns, see Rina CY. Chung,
Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: Data Privacy Issues and Implications for a Post-September 11 th
America, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & PoL'YJ. 519 (2003).
395. See Pamela Mobilia, An Economic Analysis of Gambling Addiction, in GAMBLING AND
COMMERCIAL GAMING: ESSAYS IN BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE, supra note
107, at 473 (arguing that gambling consumption is inversely related to gambling prices in
both the long and short term).
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hold percentages.396 Areas that have more competitive slot machine
play also generally feature lower hold percentages, aiding consum-
ers.397 For example, in Nevada, residents are typically more savvy
about payback percentages than are tourists, and casinos that cater to
residents often have more favorable odds than those catering to tour-
ists. 398 This lowering of prices through competition faces an enor-
mous hurdle, given that the consumer generally cannot tell the hold
percentage of individual machines at a casino and therefore has diffi-
culty shopping among casinos and within a casino for the best hold
percentages. If good information about casino hold percentages were
available, then various casinos would likely settle on a narrow range of
hold percentages, low enough that each casino could not be effec-
tively underpriced by competitors, but high enough that efficiently
run casinos would earn a sufficient return to stay in business:"'
If casinos are forced to compete more on price, then the lower
costs could reduce the social cost of gambling.4 °° Those who are ad-
dicted to playing slot machines would find their money lasting longer
and would even win money on more occasions. Although this might
cause them to gamble more money and more often, it is certainly pos-
sible that the net social costs of gambling would be reduced.40 1 More
importantly, if some consumers, alerted at an early stage by the true
cost of gambling, refrain from gambling or restrict the amount of
gambling that they engage in, then the social costs could well decline
without any restrictions on the liberty of gamblers.40 2
396. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text (discussing the publication of
payback ratios in gambling magazines and other publications).
397. Eadington, supra note 20, at 181.
398. Id. at 173. These percentages are skewed, however, because the term "gaming de-
vices" includes in its definition video poker machines, which have a higher payback per-
centage and are far more common in North Las Vegas than they are on the Las Vegas strip.
Grochowski, supra note 31.
399. Peter H. Aranson & Roger LeRoy Miller, Economic Aspects of Public Gaming, 12 CONN.
L. REv. 822, 844 (1980). Aranson and Miller conclude that, with perfect competition, only
a small number of experienced and knowledgeable slot machine users would be required
to cause the payback percentages of different casinos to converge, but, because of the
requirement that a casino have a sizeable bank to avoid the possibility of being wiped out,
there would not be perfect competition and a smaller number of larger casinos would
exist, with higher prices than perfect competition would provide. Id. at 844-45.
400. See Eadington, supra note 65, at 185 (reviewing existing economic studies regarding
the social costs of gambling).




C. "Truth In Gaming" Should Be Enacted Federally
States could and should pass "Truth in Gaming" acts to help their
citizens avoid the dangers of problem gambling. Gambling regulation
has traditionally been the province of states, rather than the federal
government.4 °3 State enactment of such informational regulation
could give a state's gambling industry a competitive advantage over
nearby states that do not require such price disclosures as gamblers
may be willing to cross state lines to have access to slot machines with
clearly marked prices and that allow them to track their gambling.
40 4
If Maryland, for example, were to enact "Truth in Gaming" laws, it
could gain players from surrounding states who prefer to know the
hold percentages of the machines they play and desire the conve-
nience of smart card technology.
"Truth in Gaming" should be passed on the federal level, how-
ever, for several reasons. Dependent as they are on gambling reve-
nues, states would probably resist enacting any regulation that might
decrease gambling, even by problem or pathological gamblers.40 5
Secondly, the form of the disclosures should be standardized on a na-
tional basis, so that a gambler can more easily understand the disclo-
sures, wherever she finds herself vacationing or otherwise traveling
and gambling.40 6 Federal regulation could also mandate the stand-
ardization that would be required for a universal smart card, while
such standardization would be more difficult if regulation were done
on a state by state basis.
Perhaps most important is that a federal enactment would avoid
the difficulties posed by Indian casinos.40 7 The Supreme Court, in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,4"' held that "tribal sover-
eignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Govern-
ment, not the States . -40' Therefore, individual states could, with
403. Koenig, supra note 172, at 1059.
404. See Benston, supra note 74 (noting that California and Nevada already compete for
customers crossing state lines).
405. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing the income that states re-
ceive from gambling).
406. See supra notes 319-322 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of stan-
dardized disclosures). A huge number of gamblers travel in order to gamble; NewJersey
reported in 1998 that 34 million annual visitors arrived in Atlantic City, 31 percent by bus.
N.J. CASINO CONTROL COMM'N, supra note 233, at 26.
407. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987)
(requiring that state regulations of Indian reservations be supported by a congressional
mandate, but noting that Congress may regulate the reservations as any other entity).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 207 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reserva-
tion, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980)).
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very limited exceptions, apply their laws to tribal Indians on reserva-
tions only if Congress has given express consent to do so.4 t ° Under
Cabazon, a state could regulate gambling on reservations only if it
barred that form of gambling altogether.41'
In response to Cabazon, and to give states some measure of con-
trol over Indian casinos while forcing them to negotiate with the In-
dian tribes, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)412 that set up a system by which Indian tribes could operate
casinos only after negotiating compacts with the states.41 Those com-
pacts would contain the restrictions and regulations to which the In-
dian tribes agreed.41 4 Because many states have already negotiated
their compacts with the Indian tribes operating casinos in the state
and those compacts can last for decades and restrict renegotiation, it
would likely be a difficult and lengthy process for the state to renegoti-
ate the compact. 415 If "Truth in Gaming" is to arrive soon, it will likely
do so at the federal, and not the state, level.
Though gaming regulation has been considered the province of
the states, the federal government has a long history of gaming regula-
tion. In 1950, Congress passed theJohnson Act, which prohibited the
use of interstate commerce to transport gaming devices and the use of
communications systems for gaming purposes.416 This act was in-
tended, however, to aid states in regulating gambling and allowed
them to be exempted from the act.41 7 Other federal regulation of
gambling includes taxing gambling businesses 41' and winnings,4 9 en-
abling the Federal Bureau of Investigations to investigate suspected
410. Id. at 207, 215.
411. Id. at 208-12; see also Rand, supra note 173, at 51.
412. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
413. Id.
414. See Oliver Kim, WMen Things Fall Apart: Liabilities And Limitations of Compacts Between
State and Tribal Governments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 49, 53-68 (2002) (discussing the legal
difficulties inherent in the compact process).
415. The compacts that California signed with Indian tribes in 1999 are not set to expire
until 2019, and the only issues that can be reopened before then are "off-reservation envi-
ronmental impacts and revenue-sharing and slot machines." Erica Werner, Davis Seeks Tri-
bal Talks, Casino Agreements: He Wants to Renegotiate to Increase Revenue Sharing with State, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 1, 2003, at 13A.
416. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (2000).
417. See Mike Roberts, The National Gambling Debate: Two Defining Issues, 18 WHrrrIER L.
REV. 579, 588-89 (1997) (citing H.R. REP. No. 81-2769, (1950), reprinted in 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4240, 4242, for legislative intent, and 15 U.S.C. § 1172 (1988 & Supp. 1992)
for the exemption from the statute).
418. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4424, 4901 (2000).
419. 26 U.S.C. §§ 61, 74 (2000).
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illegal gaming through wiretaps,4 20 regulating the use of mails for
gambling materials or lotteries,42' prohibitions against bribing ath-
letes,42 2 and racketeering in interstate commerce,423 among others.4 2 4
This long history of federal regulatory efforts involving gambling and
states' self-interest in promoting gambling and failure to mandate
price disclosure justify federal intervention to require such disclosure.
D. Application of "Truth in Gaming" to Games Involving Skill
Many casino games are not pure games of chance, but rather the
outcome of the game depends at least in part on the strategy of the
gambler.425 For example, video poker allows a gambler to choose
which digital cards to hold and which to discard, receiving new cards
in return.4 26 The average return that a player can expect varies dra-
matically based on the skill level of the player, as well as the player's
ability to concentrate during a given game.4 27 On a video poker ma-
chine that would yield on average 97.5% returns for perfect play, an
average player might expect to achieve a payback percentage of 92%
or lower. 428 In such skill-based games, the casino should disclose the
average hold percentage and hold amount generated by the average
player over the life of the machine, rather than the cost for perfect
play. It would be misleading to disclose to the average player only the
ideal hold percentage or hold amount, as normal players are likely to
lose more than the perfect play numbers would suggest.
420. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000).
421. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302 (2000) (regulating the use of mails for conducting a lot-
tery); 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (giving the U.S. Postal Service the power to seize certain
materials related to gambling from the mails).
422. 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2000).
423. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952-1953 (2000).
424. See Roberts, supra note 417, at 588-89 (listing federal regulations of gambling).
425. See Aranson & Miller, supra note 399, at 829 (distinguishing pure games of chance,
such as roulette, the outcomes of which are determined by "some kind of randomizing
device," and games of strategy, such as chess, which depend on the ability of the player to
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, and games that mix the two, such as
poker, where strategy plays a large role, but the element of chance, determining which
cards a player receives, is also important).
426. Weber & Scruggs, supra note 117, at 626.
427. See Dancer & Compton, supra note 118 (noting that the payout percentage for
many video poker games nears 100% if the player plays perfectly).
428. FRANK SCOBLETE, GUERRILLA GAMBLING: How TO BEAT THE CASINOS AT THEIR OwN
GAMES! 207-08 (1993). These figures come from the interview of an anonymous "casino
slot executive" and so, may or may not be accurate. Id.
2004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
VIII. OBJECTIONS TO REQUIRING PRICE DISCLOSURE
IN THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY
The gambling industry will likely object to regulations requiring
it to post the average costs of its games or disclose information about
gamblers' losses to them based on claims: (1) that the cost of the regu-
lations will drive up the price of gambling, increasing the harm to
gamblers while doing little to benefit consumers;4 29 (2) that gamblers
would prefer in many instances not to know the price of different ca-
sino games;4 ° (3) that the disclosure of price would be too compli-
cated for consumers to understand;4 3 1 and (4) that this disclosure may
violate gamblers' financial privacy.
4 3 2
The cost objection will require some study to answer conclusively,
in that it is difficult for a casino outsider to ascertain definitively how
much this regulation will cost to implement. However, judging from
the publicly available evidence, it does not appear that the cost will be
prohibitive.4 33 Given that the newest slot machines are built around
computer-driven touch screens, designing and programming the new
machines to provide price information should not be enormously ex-
pensive.43 4 Even existing machines might be reprogrammed. Truth
in Gaming regulation could grandfather in existing machines that
could not easily be altered, simply requiring these older machines to
have stickers affixed to them bearing accurate hold percentages.
Then, after some period of time has passed to allow electronic gaming
machine manufacturers to change the programming and design of
their computer-driven machines, casinos would be permitted to install
only those new machines that displayed the hold percentages and
hold amount for the sum wagered, and that allowed gamblers to ac-
cess their win and loss records either directly from the casino's
records or through the gambler's own smart card.
Many casinos already obtain and store the data that would be re-
quired to give individual gamblers their net wins and losses record
and have assembled databases that could easily be accessed to provide
429. See Associated Press, supra note 149.
430. See Weinert, supra note 154 (noting that after regulators allowed publication of
payout odds some casinos exploited the shift by running ads in which they claimed to have
the "loosest slots").
431. See supra notes 112-113 (discussing the complexity of calculating payout
percentages).
432. See Binkley, supra note 373 (noting that casino records on customers can be
subpoenaed).
433. See Higgins, supra note 133 (noting that modern slot machines are designed for




this information to the consumer. 5 Even if this information initially
might not be available from each slot machine, requiring the casinos
to erect a few kiosks with machines that could read their customers'
slot club card or smart card and display a report would not be a sub-
stantial expense given the huge profits that casinos reap from their
electronic games. Small slot machine operators would likely argue
that assembling such a database would be too expensive for them;
therefore, the requirement that casinos give gamblers access to their
slot club information should likely be limited only either to casinos or
chains with a minimum number of slot machines or to any casino that
tracks its customers through slot clubs. However, even small slot ma-
chine operators should be required to buy only those new machines
that can read and write to smart cards.
The second objection, that some gamblers prefer not to know
their chances of winning or losing, may be dealt with by allowing each
casino to keep a certain percentage of its tables, perhaps 10% initially,
as "mystery machines." For these machines, the casino would not be
required to disclose the average losses per coin but rather only that
the machine is not so marked. If individual gamblers wanted to play
machines that were not marked, they could do so. The casinos should
be barred, however, from advertising, offering, or guaranteeing
higher payback rates on their mystery machines in an effort to subvert
the disclosure remedies by ensuring that gamblers only wanted to play
games without disclosures.
Also, the use of tracking tools like smart cards should be entirely
voluntary for gamblers. A gambler should be given the option of us-
ing a slot club card that does not allow her to access her own gambling
records. However, casinos should be prevented from attempting to
coerce gamblers into using only non-tracking slot club cards.
Casinos will likely argue that price information for slot machines
is too difficult to understand and that they should not be required to
spend money to tell gamblers information that gamblers will not com-
436prehend or use. Such an argument would fly in the face of evi-
dence that gamblers are eager to acquire price information for slot
machines, purchase books and magazines searching for that informa-
tion, and are price sensitive to the extent that they can ascertain
price. 7 Additionally, it goes against the most basic principles of con-
435. See Barfield, supra note 5 (detailing the large amount of information that casinos
already compile through voluntary casino clubs).
436. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in calculat-
ing price information).
437. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
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sumer protection for a business to argue that its price structure is diffi-
cult to understand, and therefore, it should not have to disclose its
prices to consumers.
Casinos may also argue that providing win-loss statistics to gam-
blers may cause privacy concerns, given the chance that this informa-
438tion might fall into the hands of third parties. For example, once
betting information is available to gamblers, it might be sought in dis-
covery in a divorce action. However, these privacy concerns are al-
ready present, as can be demonstrated by the recent outing of William
Bennett as a heavy gambler.4 3 9 Although Bennett no doubt thought
that the records of his wins and losses was a matter between him and
his casino, those records were leaked to news media and were the sub-
ject of wide comment.44 ° Truth in Gaming legislation could include
privacy protections greater than are currently in place, regulating
when and how casinos may disclose the gambling information that
they keep. Furthermore, systems of encryption and password protec-
tion could be put into place to protect the privacy of borrowers.
Casinos would likely argue that gamblers enjoy playing slot ma-
chines more when they do not think about losing.4 4 ' However, a
counter argument would be that gamblers could enjoy playing slot
machines more when they know how much on average they might
expect to lose on a particular game, so that when they lose less than
the average, they would feel like winners. And if casinos were forced
to compete based on price and lowered their prices as a result, gam-
blers would lose less money on average and enjoy gambling more.
Casinos also will likely argue that price information is not useful
for slot machine players because it would take a significant number of
plays for the individual player's average loss to approach the hold per-
centage of the machine.4 4 2 Because a player might lose or win much
more or much less than the average, casinos would object that giving
the average loss adds little useful information to the gambler.4 43 Fur-
438. See Binkley, supra note 373 (noting that casino customer records can be
subpoenaed).
439. Katharine Q. Seelye, William Bennett Reportedly Lost Millions Gambling, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., May 3, 2003, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/content/news/O503/O3ben
nett.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).
440. See id. (citing "40 pages of internal casino documents" indicating that Bennett lost
more than $8 million by gambling).
441. See Watt, supra note 144 (noting that many seniors just play slots for fun).
442. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (detailing the method used to calculate a
hold percentage).
443. For example, the Australian Gaming Manufacturers Association argued that, "[f] or
an individual player, the return ratio is a very imprecise measure. For either game [of two
games approved for use in New South Wales] to tend within plus or minus 1% of the
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thermore, the gaming industry is likely to argue that it can arrange
two hypothetical games so that it would be possible to have a higher
probability of breaking even during a given number of wagers on the
machine with a higher average cost than on the lower average cost
machine.444
Neither argument is convincing, however, because, as noted by
the Australian Productivity Commission, it is
apparent that over a reasonable period of time-say a month
and certainly a year-the determinant of the financial out-
come of playing a gaming machine is almost exclusively its
player return. The standard deviation as a share of the mean
player losses becomes much smaller after a large number of
trials.445
Therefore, the more often a gambler plays, the more likely her losses
are to conform to the hold percentage of the machines she plays. 446 A
slot machine player who conducts more than 500 wagers an hour for
200 hours, spread over several months, will have played more than a
hundred thousand times and will almost certainly have an individual
loss percentage close to the hold percentage of the machines she
expected average would require a sample of 5 million games." AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY
COMM'N, supra note 339, at 16.15.
444. See id. For example, if one dollar machine has a one in a million chance of repay-
ing two million dollars, then it would, on average, return two dollars for any dollar wa-
gered. If another dollar machine has a 99% chance of returning only the dollar bet, and
1% chance of returning nothing, then it has a hold percentage of 1%, much worse than
the average gain percentage of 100% for the other machine. The casino industry would
argue, though, that for a small number of plays, a player is much more likely to break even
with the more expensive machine, as it will merely return the player's wager, while the
other machine will almost always return nothing. See id.
445. Id. at 16.16
446. This convergence toward the hold percentage is due to the Law of Large Numbers,
which notes that for a series of random events, each new event remains random and is not
affected by what precedes or follows it. See Dennis O'Brien, Winning at Slots; What are the
Odds?, BALT. SUN, Mar. 10, 2003, at 6A. However, as the number of random events mounts,
the sum of the results becomes predictable and converges on average likelihood of each
result. Id. For example, while a gambler playing a machine with a 5.26% hold percentage
has almost a third of a chance of being ahead after ten wagers, it would be virtually impossi-
ble for the gambler to be ahead after 10,000 wagers, but it is likely that the player's individ-
ual loss percentage would be within a few percentage points of the machine's hold
percentage. See HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 12-13. Hannum and Cabot calculate
that the chances of a gambler being ahead after 10,000 wagers against a house advantage
of 5.26% is 0.0000065%, over fifteen million to one. Id. If a person plays a slot machine
with a hold percentage of 6.97% 10,000 times, there is less than a 40% chance that the
person's individual hold percentage will be under 6%. If she plays 100,000 times, there is
less than a 15% chance her individual hold percentage will be less than 6%, and at
1,000,000 plays the chances are less than 0.1%. See Milligan, supra note 107, at 184-86.
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plays. 447 The provision of accurate price information is most helpful,
then, to the players who need it the most-the frequent and fast slots
players who are most likely to be problem gamblers or risk becoming
problem gamblers.448
Furthermore, gambling consumers have many different pieces of
information at their disposal to decide how much to gamble, where to
gamble, and on which machines. 44 ' They may prefer machines with
themes matched to television shows, or machines near the door of the
casino. The hold percentage of any machine that gamblers might
choose is surely among the pieces of information they should be al-
lowed to consider in making their decision.45 °
IX. CONCLUSION
Gambling is a growing industry, and with the spreading legaliza-
tion of gambling throughout the country, the amount of gambling is
determined primarily by the decisions of individual gamblers, not by
the state. To make those decisions efficiently, individual gamblers
should be given clear, accurate, and timely information about the true
costs of gambling. Additionally, they should be provided that infor-
mation in a format they can easily use and understand and that is
tailored to their individual needs and uses.
If the gambling industry wishes to be treated as a legitimate in-
dustry, it must act like one. The most basic step toward legitimacy is
disclosing its prices to consumers, not hiding them under a veil of
secrecy. This disclosure, along with assisting individuals track their
winnings and losses, will not only aid recreational gamblers, but may
also help pathological gamblers, as present research suggests that in-
formational remedies may aid problem and pathological gamblers in
attempts to control their gambling. At the very least, effective price
disclosure will alert problem or potential problem gamblers to the
risks they run and the costs they are paying. To be rational consum-
ers, gamblers should be given adequate price information. Then, they
can determine whether the gamble is worth the price.
447. See HANNUM & CABOT, supra note 103, at 171 (stating that a casino might roughly
estimate that a slot player will average five hundred wagers per hour); Watt, supra note 144
(noting that some elderly players play for extended periods). "Their member cards locked
into place, the women sit tethered by their cords to the machines for hours at a time." Id.
448. See Gurnett, supra note 98 (noting that "[r]apid response items, such as ... video
slot machines, accelerate [compulsive gambling disorders]").
449. See supra notes 140-190 (discussing information on slot machines available to
gamblers).
450. See AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 339, at 16.15 (arguing that the
hold percentage of a machine should be available to consumers).
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